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GENETIC DATABASES AND BIOBANKS:
WHO CONTROLS OUR GENETIC PRIVACY?
Yael Bregman-Eschet
ABSTRACT
In the past several years a growing number of private biotech companies have been 
collecting and storing our genetic information and bodily tissues and linking it to life-
long medical histories. Many of these commercial companies have close relationships 
with the public sector: they rely on public institutions to get access to certain medical
data and tissue samples, while the public sector relies on those companies for 
commercial exploitation of the research. Despite the unique nature of the information 
collected and the sensitivity of genetic databases, these private bio-libraries are 
largely unregulated in the United States.
This article examines who has control over the assembly, use, and dissemination of 
genetic information in various types of genetic databases (e.g., public and private 
databases), and how this power should be managed based on its effects on the privacy
and autonomy interests of individuals. The article analyzes three examples: the 
Icelandic Health Sector Database, the U.K. Biobank, and the operation of private, 
commercial bio-repositories in the United States. It further examines, via these three 
examples, the increased involvement of the private sector that collects and stores 
medical and genetic information and the growing partnerships between the private 
and public sectors in the genetic realm.  This analysis reveals the potential abuses of 
our personal genetic information by those who have control over it, and the need to 
place limitations on the uses of this information. This article calls for the adoption of 
industry-wide fair information practices and proposes a set of fair information 
principles tailored to meet the specific privacy needs in the genetic realm.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2000, two teams – one privately owned and the other publicly funded –
announced of the mapping of the human genome.1 In the wake of this scientific 
breakthrough, and the better understanding of various genetic disorders and physical 
and psychological traits that it promised, expectations for the development of new 
treatments and cures for various medical conditions has grown tremendously. The 
Human Genome Project was therefore accompanied by multiple superlatives: the 
genome itself was described as the "book of life" and the mapping of the human 
genome was compared to the search for the Holy Grail.2  However, this new genetic 
research also posed a growing threat to personal privacy, as vast amounts of medical 
and genetic information could now be better understood, compiled, and linked 
together. 
In this era of information technology, hospitals, research institutions, and other 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies are enabled to establish huge databanks 
containing the medical information of individuals, and then to link this data with 
sensitive genetic information. This massive compilation of medical data, linked to 
genetic material and information, notwithstanding its benefit to the provision of health 
care and the optimization of genetic research, poses significant privacy concerns. The 
fact that our private genetic information is often times out of our personal control, 
combined with the lack of adequate safeguards to ensure the privacy of this 
information by those who do control it, greatly increases these concerns.
1 KEVIN DAVIES, CRACKING THE GENOME: INSIDE THE RACE TO UNLOCK HUMAN DNA (2nd ed., 2002); 
LORI B. ANDREWS, MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, & MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW AND 
POLICY, 31-33 (2002).
2 THE CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (Daniel J. 
Kevles & Leroy Hood, ed., 1992); and also RICHARD LEWONTIN, IT AIN'T NECESSARILY SO: THE 
DREAM OF THE HUMAN GENOME  AND OTHER ILLUSIONS, 133-196 (2nd ed., 2001) (refuting the use of 
the Holy Grail metaphor).  
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Genetic databases,3 biobanks,4 and population databases are already here, most 
probably to stay. The United States, the United Kingdom, Iceland, and Estonia are 
some examples of countries in which genetic databases already exist or are currently 
being developed. Of these, there are different types of genetic databases with diverse 
goals at heart. Forensic,5 military,6 commercial,7 and research databases,8 are a few 
that come to mind. There are also various modes of control over genetic information: 
public, private, and a hybrid of the two – with the private sector relying on the public 
sector to get access to the data, and the public sector relying on the private one for 
commercial exploitation of the research.9
The Icelandic government, for instance, granted a private, for-profit company 
a 12-year license to create an electronic database of the medical records of the entirety 
of the Icelandic population, and authorized this company to link the electronic 
database consisting of detailed medical information to two additional databases: 
3
  Genetic databases refer to the storage of genetic information obtained from the analysis of tissue 
samples. See also Jean E. McEwen, DNA Databanks in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY 
AND THE CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA, 231 (Mark A. Rothstein, ed., 1997). 
4
  Biobanks (also named DNA databanks) refer to databases in which the actual tissue samples are 
stored and not just the genetic information derived thereof. See also McEwen, id. 
5
  An example of such forensic databases is the establishment of DNA Dragnets in order to facilitate 
the apprehension of criminals. See also, infra section II.A.
6
  The United States military is another example of a governmentally controlled biobank in which 
DNA samples of soldiers are being stored for the purpose of identifying the remains of missing 
soldiers. For further discussion see McEwen, supra note 3, at 239-240. 
7
  The number of private, commercial biobanks consisting of DNA and tissue samples is rapidly 
growing. Examples of commercial companies running private biobanks include Genomics 
Collaborative Inc., Ardais Corporation, and DNA Sciences, Inc. Each of these companies holds 
thousands of samples which are being used for the companies' commercial gain. See Jocelyn Kaiser, 
Population Databases Boom, From Iceland to the U.S., 298 SCIENCE 1158, 1159 (November 8, 
2002); and also Robin Marantz-Henig, The Genome in Black and White (and Gray), THE NEW 
YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 47 (October 10, 2004).
8
  The Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP) is a good example of a proposed DNA database for 
research purposes. The purpose of this worldwide project was to sample and archive human genetic 
diversity, and especially samples from indigenous populations "as the first step towards enormous 
leaps in our grasp of human origins, evolution, prehistory, and potential." This project had failed due 
to the resistance voiced by indigenous groups that dubbed the project as the "vampire project." 
Recently, however, attempts have been made to revive the HGDP by the National Geographic 
Society and I.B.M. See Jenny Reardon, The Human Genome Diversity Project: A Case Study in 
Coproduction, 31 SOCIAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE 357 (2001); Nicholas Wade, Geographic Society Is 
Seeking a Genealogy of Humankind, THE NEW YORK TIMES at A16 (April 13, 2005).
9
 Alan Petersen, Securing Our Genetic Health: Engendering Trust in UK Biobank, 27(2) SOCIOLOGY 
OF HEALTH & ILLNESS 271, 276 (2005).
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Iceland's genealogical database and a genetic database created by the company itself. 
The United Kingdom is currently in the midst of establishing the world's largest 
biobank, with samples taken from 500,000 volunteers; the information collected will 
be linked to the medical records and other health and life-style information of the 
participants. And in the United States, private companies, such as Ardais Corporation 
and Genomics Collaborative are establishing huge, private bio-repositories containing 
tissue samples linked to medical information and history, collected directly from 
patients or received from hospitals. 
The analysis of these three examples reveals the potential abuses of some of 
our most personal and sensitive information by both public and private entities, and 
suggests the need to establish industry-wide fair information practices that will 
address the specific problems that arise from the collection and storage of genetic 
information and the linkage of this information to other types of personal information. 
Moreover, the analysis of these three examples – the Icelandic Health Sector Database, 
the U.K. Biobank, and the operation of private, commercial bio-repositories in the 
United States – accentuates the need to redefine the status of those who control such 
sensitive information, preferably crowning them as trustees – not owners – of the 
medical and genetic information they collect and compile.    
This article, hence, deals with the question of control. It examines who has 
control over the assembly, use, and dissemination of information from various types 
of genetic databases (e.g., public and private databases), and suggests how this power 
might be managed, taking into account its effects on the privacy and autonomy 
interests of individuals. Three key terms are used throughout the article: genetic 
privacy, autonomy, and property rights. The term genetic privacy applies the concept 
of privacy to genetic-related findings and refers to the use of personal data derived 
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from one's genes.10 Autonomy, or bioautonomy, is used to describe one's decisional 
power over her genetic information and the uses made of it.11 Lastly, property rights
are used to refer to interests in an object (in this article – one's genes, tissues, or 
information derived thereof) that are attached to it, and that can be traded.12
Part I will address the ongoing debate as to whether genetic information is in 
fact different from other types of medical information. It will explain the threats to 
personal privacy posed by the growing number of bio-repositories and by their 
linkage to other medical and genetic databases, particularly if owned by private 
entities. Part II will examine several public and private bio-repositories already 
existing in the United States, will explore some of the potential abuses of genetic 
information stored in large databases and databanks, and will explain the need for the 
implementation of fair information practices for the accumulation, use, access, and 
transfer of the genetic information stored in these databases. 
Part III will use the Icelandic Health Sector Database as a case study to 
explore new collaborative enterprises between governmental and commercial entities 
and the merger of knowledge accumulated in public and private repositories. This part 
will identify the risks and benefits of such collaborations, and will compare the 
Icelandic model that is based on commercial exploitation, to that chosen in the United 
Kingdom, which is based on public ownership, concluding that the latter is a better 
10
 Anita Allen portrays the term "genetic privacy" as consistent of four dimensional aspects: 1) 
informational privacy that relates to access to personal information; 2) physical privacy, which 
relates to access to persons and personal spaces; 3) decisional privacy, which relates to 
governmental or other third party interference with personal choices; and 4) proprietary privacy that 
relates to ownership interests in the human body. See Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging 
Concepts and Values, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE 
GENETIC ERA, 33-34 (Mark Rothstein, ed., 1997).
11 See also David E. Winickoff, Governing Population Genomics: Law, Bioethics, and Biopolitics in 
Three Case Studies, 43 JURIMETRICS JOURNAL 187, 189 (Winter 2003) (defining bioinformation as 
"phenotypic information drawn from medical records and genotypic information drawn from tissue 
samples").
12 See also Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARVARD LAW REVIEW
2055, 2058 (2004) (defining "property" as "any interest in an object, whether tangible or intangible, 
that is enforceable against the world. From this perspective, property rights run with the object, and 
can be contrasted with contract rights, which bind only parties in privity").
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formulation to protect the autonomy and genetic privacy of individuals. Finally, 
conclusions drawn from the Icelandic and British examples will be applied to the 
American landscape. The inductions made from the two foreign examples to the 
United States emphasize the need to place limitations and safeguards in the form of
self-regulation that will address the specific privacy concerns raised in the 
information technology – genetic era. A set of fair information principles tailored to
the specific concerns raised by genetic databases and biobanks is therefore suggested. 
I. GENETIC DATABASES: A NEW THREAT TO PRIVACY?
Medical data is considered to be highly sensitive, personal information.
According to the 9th Circuit "one can think of few subject areas more personal and 
more likely to implicate privacy interests than that of one's health or genetic make-
up." 13 Despite the sensitive and personal nature of medical information, certain 
proponents of the free market – namely Richard Posner and Richard Epstein – call for 
open access to medical and genetic information in the name of economic efficiency.14
However, open access to both medical and genetic information may have far reaching 
social implications in the form of social stigma and genetic determinism that may lead, 
for instance, to employment and insurance discrimination, which are socially as well 
as economically undesirable.15 For this reason, the free market may fail to adequately 
protect medical privacy.16 Medical information thus requires considerable privacy 
protection and confidentiality, a necessity long recognized by the Hippocratic Oath.17
13
 Norman Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (1998).  
14 See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW, 393 (1978); and Richard A. 
Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Responses to New Technology, 74 
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1 (1994).
15
 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information, 76 TEXAS LAW 
REVIEW 1, 25-31 (1997); Allen, supra note 10. 
16 See Schwartz, id., at 42-51 (indicating three main reasons for the market failure to adequately 
protect medical privacy: lack of public knowledge regarding the use and treatment of personal data; 
an agency problem; and a collective action problem); and more generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE 
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Genetic information is a sub-class of medical information. 18  It includes 
information that may be retrieved from an individual’s DNA that, with the growing 
understanding of the human genome and its mapping, may reveal three levels of 
sensitive information: personal information about the individual such as genes, traits, 
and predisposition to certain diseases; medical information about an individual's
kinship that can be attributed to one's genes; and information about the heritage of the 
individual, e.g. the routes and origin of her ancestors. 
Despite the sensitivity of the information which may be retrieved from one's 
DNA and tissue samples, the degree of privacy protection that should be granted to 
genetic information is disputed. Legal scholar George Annas considers genetic 
information to be especially sensitive medical information because of the different
levels of personal information it may reveal: not only about the individual, but also 
regarding her relatives.19 According to Annas, our DNA is a reflection of our "future 
DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, 81-87 (2004) (listing four 
misgivings of the market in protecting personal data: the limitations of contract law; problems with 
bargaining power; the one-size-fits-all problem; and inequalities in knowledge).
17
 The Hippocratic Oath was originally written approximately 2,400 years ago (400 B.C.E.) in ancient 
Greece, and it declares: "…What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of 
the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I will keep 
to myself, holding such things shameful to be spoken about." See
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/oath_classical.html (last visited January 2006).
18
 Although not all genetic information is necessarily a secret (e.g., the color of one's eyes or hair), if 
privacy is conceptualized as more than the classical secrecy paradigm, as suggested by Solove, 
genetic information may be viewed as private information.  SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 143 (stating 
that: "we must abandon the secrecy paradigm. Privacy involves an expectation of a certain degree of 
accessibility of information. Under this alternative view, privacy entails control over and limitations 
on certain uses of information, even if the information is not concealed."); and also infra notes 121-
123 and the accompanying text, explaining the need for different levels of protection for genetic 
information according to the degree of sensitivity of the information.
19
 This special sensitivity arises, according to Annas, because genetic information encompasses in it 
private information about one's self, about our relatives, and is important to private decision-making. 
See George J. Annas, Genetic Privacy: There Ought to Be a Law, 4 TEXAS REVIEW OF LAW & 
POLITICS 9, 9-10 (1999). For the opposite view see George Poste, Privacy and Confidentiality in the 
age of Genetic Engineering, 4 TEXAS REVIEW OF LAW & POLITICS 25 (1999) (arguing that the 
distinction between genetic data and other classes of medical information is false); and also Thomas 
H. Murray, Genetic Exceptionalism and "Future Diaries": Is Genetic Information Different from 
other Medical Information? In GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN 
THE GENETIC ERA, 60 (Mark A. Rothstein, ed., 1997).
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diaries," with the ability to reveal predisposition to illnesses, traits, and even life 
span.20
However, this "future diary" metaphor has been widely contested by others.21
It has been argued, in contrast, that "genetic information is neither unique nor 
distinctive in its ability to offer probabilistic peeks into our future health,"22 and that 
any potential difference between genetic information and other classes of medical 
information is at most that of degree, not of kind.23 Others see genetic data as distinct 
from other types of medical information, but not unique.24 Similarly, the 9th Circuit 
concluded, in a majority opinion, that a blood sample is not substantially different 
than fingerprinting,25 although Judge Nelson, in dissent, argued that: "DNA genetic 
pattern analysis catalogs uniquely private genetic facts about the individual that 
should be subject to rigorous confidentiality requirements even broader than the 
protection of an individual's medical records," 26  thus differentiating genetic 
information from other classes of medical data or fingerprint records.27
20
 Annas, id., at 11-12.
21 See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Genetics and Privacy, 4 TEXAS REVIEW OF LAW & POLITICS 17 (1999) 
(arguing that the "future diary" metaphor does not hold: first because actual diaries are much more 
diverse than out our genetic makeup; and second because while diaries contain our thought on past 
occurring, our DNA can reveal us only probabilities); and also Murray, supra note 19; Allen, supra
note 10, at 49-51; Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee 
Protections for a Brave New  Workplace, 96 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1497 (2002) 
(Suggesting a different metaphor that compares human genes to the raw material input into a 
production process) id., at 1532-1537.
22
 Murray, supra note 19, at 64.
23
 Ginsburg, supra note 21, at 18.
24
 Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 451, 489-492 (1995).
25 See Rise v. State of Oregon 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir., 1995) in which the majority concluded that 
obtaining a blood sample from a convicted felon or a sex offender is not substantially different from 
fingerprinting.
26
 Id. at 1569. 
27 See also Jeffrey S. Grand, The Blooding of America: Privacy and the DNA Dragnet, 23 CARDOZO 
LAW REVIEW 2277 (August 2000) (rejecting the analogy of genetic makeup to fingerprints as being 
too simplistic and stating that: "biological samples volunteered in DNA dragnets have the potential 
to reveal far more intimate information about the individual donor than a simple fingerprint.") id., at 
2288-2289.
Yael Bregman-Eschet
Genetic Databases and Biobanks: Who Controls our Genetic Privacy?
10
When referring to genetic databanks, one must distinguish between two types 
of repositories.28 The first is genetic databases, which consist of information derived 
from individual genetic material and DNA. The second type of genetic repositories –
DNA banks or biobanks – is a collection of tissue samples, such as blood, saliva, or 
hair, from which our DNA can be derived. Both types of banks pose potential threats 
to privacy: genetic databases do so via the accumulation of genetic information in one 
electronic form, and DNA banks do so by allowing for the possibility of making 
endless amounts of DNA copies for different uses from one single sample. 
Computerization is one of the greatest challenges to medical privacy, genetic 
privacy included, in the information technology age. 29  The computerization of 
medical records makes the medical process more efficient, optimizes health care, and 
enhances research.30 But the compilation of such vast amounts of sensitive data, in the 
form of medical and genetic information, in a single electronic database to which 
numerous people in different locations have access, also undermines personal 
privacy.31
28
 Murray, supra note 19, at 63-64; McEwen, supra note 3; Human Genetics Commission, Inside 
Information: Balancing Interests in the Use of Personal Genetic Data, summary report 12-13, 31 
(May 2002) (hereinafter: U.K. Human Genetics Commission) at 
http://www.hgc.gov.uk/UploadDocs/DocPub/Document/insideinformation_summary.pdf (last 
visited January 2006).
29
 Mark A. Rothstein, Medical Privacy – an Oxymoron? NEWSDAY A25 (March 15, 1999). See also
SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 2-4 (2004) (discussing the problems of digital dossiers).
30 See Gostin, supra note 24; Poste, supra note 19; and also Schwartz, supra note 15, at 12-15.
31 Gostin, id., at 467-468; and also the United States Supreme Court's decision in Whalen v. Roe 
acknowledging "the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal 
information in computerized data banks or other massive government files." Whalen v. Roe 429 U.S. 
589, 605 (1977). See also SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 131-132. For a more general description of the 
benefits as well as the privacy threats associated with the Global Information Infrastructure see
Larry Irving, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Introduction to 
Privacy and Self-Regulation in the Information Age (June 1997), available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/intro.htm (last visited January 2006) (stating that: "The 
Global Information Infrastructure has tremendous potential to bring economic, social and cultural 
benefits to America and its citizens. Because it will facilitate and expand the flow of information 
between people and from place to place, the GII promises enhanced educational and employment 
opportunities, greater citizen participation, and improved delivery of government services. 
Information technologies promise to revolutionize the manner in which commerce is transacted 
domestically and across international borders. The GII has provided faster, cheaper, and more 
reliable communication of business data, so that great distances and multiple time zones are no 
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Biobanks, on the other hand, create a somewhat different challenge, 
particularly to the privacy and autonomy of the individual. The ability to store tissue 
and DNA samples for long periods of time and the possibility to create endless 
number of DNA copies from a single sample, give rise to the concern that these 
samples could be used in the future for purposes other than those for which they were 
originally intended.32 For instance, stored tissue samples, collected before genetic 
testing was even available, can now be used to create DNA databanks for research 
purposes.33 The U.K. Human Genetics Commission, for example, found it acceptable 
to use, for research purposes, old collections of samples for which informed consent 
was not sought, as long as the samples were anonymized.34
Alternatively, many biobanks ask their research subjects for open-ended 
permission to use their genetic information for future research.35 This type of broad 
permission is a weak form of consent. It is weak because the research subject provides 
consent without being aware of the specific uses for which the samples might be used, 
or of possible future uses, which are yet unknown.36 Genuine informed consent can 
only be granted if the research subjects understand and agree to the general nature of 
longer barriers to transacting business. But while information technologies can bring these benefits 
to Americans, they also present new challenges to individual privacy. Not only does the GII make 
the collection, storage, and transmission of large amounts of personal data possible, use of the GII 
creates information trails that, without proper safeguards, could reveal the personal details of 
people's lives. Failure to recognize and protect the privacy interests could slow the growth of the GII. 
If we are to realize the full potential of the information infrastructure, the legitimate privacy interests 
of users of the GII must be acknowledged and protected").
32
 Annas, supra note 19, at 13-14. Such use if unauthorized by the individual who gave the sample will 
theoretically require additional consent from the patient.  
33
  Gostin, supra note 24, at 467-468.
34 U.K. Human Genetics Commission, supra note 28. 
35 ELISA EISMAN ET AL., CASE STUDIES OF EXISTING HUMAN TISSUE REPOSITORIES: "BEST PRACTICES" 
FOR THE GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC AGE, chapter seven: Privacy, Ethical Concerns, and Consent 
Issues, 121, 132-135 (2003), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG120.pdf (last visited January 2006); David 
E. Winickoff & Richard N. Winickoff, The Charitable Trust as a Model for Genomic Biobanks, 
349(12) THE NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 1180, 1180-1181 (September 18, 2003).
36
  Winickoff & Winickoff, id. 
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the research, are asked for additional consent if different purposes are sought in the 
future, and have the power to oppose specific uses.37
Similar concerns, and in particular the inability to fully consent to future 
research techniques and uses, brought the United States military, for instance, to 
propose a fifty-year limitation on the length of time that blood and saliva samples
(which are collected from military personnel to facilitate the identification of missing
soldiers) are kept. 38 In addition, soldiers who leave the service can request the 
destruction of the samples collected by the military. The issue of long term sample 
storage was raised following the voicing of concerns that the military could 
potentially make additional, unauthorized uses of the genetic information collected, 
such as a "dragnet" for detecting criminals, or to determine predisposition to 
homosexual behavior.39
The privacy and autonomy threats, which accompany the information 
technology age and its mega databases that hold immense amounts of personal 
information, are not necessarily new. Nonetheless, the challenges of protecting 
medical and genetic privacy have been growing.  One reason is the linkage made 
between medical information and the two types of genetic banks – genetic databases 
and biobanks. This linkage, which is increasingly being implemented to facilitate 
scientific progress, creates – absent sufficient safeguards – new dimensions to the 
existing privacy concerns relating to medical and genetic information. 
Second, the private sector, is becoming increasingly involved in the collection 
and assembling of medical and genetic information and in linking it together, both 
37 See generally, SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 86 (stating that "a more complete range of choices must 
permit individuals to express their preferences for how information will be protected, how it will be 
used in the future, and with whom it will be shared."); and also U.K. Human Genetics Commission, 
supra note 28, at 10-11.
38
 McEwen, supra note 3, at 239-240; Annas, supra note 19, at 14.
39
 McEwen, id., at 239-240.
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independently and through collaborative work with governmental or research 
institutions, which willingly transfer individuals' genetic material and/or information 
to the hands of the private sector.40 This partnership between the public and private 
sectors is evident in the Icelandic model, as well as from private agreements between 
hospitals and commercial biotech companies in the United States.
Although, the involvement of the private sector is crucial for efficient 
technological development,41 the growing control that the private industry has over 
personal medical information and genetic material is problematic. First, unlike the 
public and non-profit sectors, whose primary goals should be increasing the pubic 
welfare, the private sector is primarily concerned with its own financial gains and the 
maximization of shareholder profits. Because of this, the danger exists that, absent 
adequate safeguards, the private sector may misuse this sensitive information in times 
of economic crises, such as selling the information in the event of bankruptcy.42 The 
existing legal protection for medical and genetic information is insufficient to prevent 
this type of conduct that undermines the research subjects' genetic privacy and 
interests.43
Third, absent sufficient restrictions and guidelines for the storage of genetic 
information, each company is free to choose the levels of security granted to genetic 
information. As a result, we are witnessing incoherency in the manner in which 
sensitive information is stored and handled, a phenomenon that not only undermines 
40
 For the history of public-sector and private-sector databases and the flow of information between the 
two, see generally SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 13-21.
41 The race between private company Celera Genomics and the publicly funded Human Genome 
project, which dramatically accelerated the sequencing of the human genome, is a good example. 
Due to the involvement of a private company and the competition it entailed, 90% of the sequencing 
was reached 5 years before the original end date. See DAVIES, supra note 1. 
42 See also infra section II.C.5. 
43 See also the U.K. Human Genetics Commission, supra note 28, at 8-9.
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the privacy interests of the research subjects, but is also viewed as placing greater 
difficulties in the conduct of the research.44
The growing control that private commercial companies have over our 
medical and genetic information and material; the lack of sufficient safeguards in 
place to protect personal privacy; and potential partnerships between the public and 
the private sectors that bestow additional power to the hands of the private sector, all
intensify the threat to our autonomy and genetic privacy. Hence, this article calls for 
greater caution in the collection and usage of genetic information and material and its 
assembling with other types of medical information, and encourages the industry to 
embrace industry-specific fair information practices that will put limitations and 
restrictions on the compilation and usage of genetic  data.
II. GENETIC DATABASES IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS
A. Public Sector Bio-Repositories
The public sector is probably the primary collector of genetic material. The 
largest collection of blood and tissue samples in the United States, as well as in the 
world, currently belongs to the National Pathology Repository of the Armed Forces 
Institute of Pathology (AFIP), where 92 million human specimens dating back to 
1864 are held.45 The British government plans to establish the world's largest biobank 
with blood and tissue samples taken from 500,000 volunteers, linked to their medical 
information and history.46 It is not surprising, therefore, that most privacy concerns 
are directed towards the government and its control over this sensitive data. Most 
often the concerns regarding genetic privacy are being raised in the criminal context 
44 See infra note 138.
45 See the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology website at 
http://www.afip.org/Departments/repository/npr.html (last visited January 2006); and EISMAN ET 
AL., supra note 35, at 161.
46 See http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about/overview.php (last visited January 2006).
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and pertain to the creation of forensics databases, "DNA dragnets," and the fear that 
they will be used in a racial or discriminatory manner.47
The term “DNA dragnet” describes the collection of biological samples, such 
as blood or saliva, from individuals not specifically suspected of a crime.48 These 
samples are thereafter used to create DNA profiles that are compared to the profile of 
the suspect, which is based on evidence from the crime scene.49 The first DNA 
dragnet was used in England in the late 1980s following a rape and murder case. In 
the course of the attempts to apprehend the perpetrator, 4,500 blood samples from 
males were collected and assembled by the police, until eventually the suspect was 
caught.50 Today, such DNA dragnets are created and used throughout the world.51
San Diego was the first jurisdiction in the United States to establish a DNA 
dragnet in the early 1990s, collecting blood and saliva samples from hundreds of 
volunteers, in order to catch a serial killer who was believed to be African-
American.52 In fact, one of the primary purposes of these DNA dragnets is to expose 
those who refuse to participate in the sample collection. Despite the voluntary nature 
of participation in a DNA dragnet, refusal to take part in the collective efforts to find 
the suspect immediately raises police suspicion.53 Today, most states have a system of 
DNA dragnets, and the specimens collected may be kept by the state indefinitely, 
even though the majority of the samples are taken from law-abiding citizens.54 Many 
fear that these sample collections that contain the participants' DNA may be exploited 
47
 Many of the DNA dragnets involve suspects belonging to a racial group such as African-Americans. 
See for example, Grand, supra note 27, at 2278-2280; and also Marantz-Henig, supra note 7. 
48
 Grand, id., at 2279-2280, 2282-2284.
49
 Grand, id., at footnote 1.
50
 Grand, id., at 2285; DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW, 267-268 
(2003).
51
 Including the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Australia, and the United States. See Grand, id., at 
2285.
52 See also Grand, id., at 2278-2279.
53 See Grand, id., at 2282-2284; and SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 50, at 274. 
54
 Grand, id., at 2279-2280.
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in the future for uses other than the identification purposes they were originally 
intended for.55
In addition, DNA samples are now routinely collected by the state from people 
convicted of crimes such as rape and murder, or even people charged with 
misdemeanor crimes. Moreover, some states allow the collection of DNA samples 
from those merely arrested and not yet convicted of a crime. 56 The DNA 
Identification Act of 1994 authorizes the FBI to establish the national DNA database 
CODIS (Combined DNA Identification System). The CODIS database allows states 
to share and compare their DNA databases, thus increasing the efficiency and 
probability of solving crimes, but also undermining the privacy interests of those 
whose DNA samples have been collected and stored, and who are not necessarily 
convicted of any crime. 
One of the major privacy concerns associated with these bio-collections is the 
possibility of unauthorized or unintended dissemination and use of the stored 
samples.57 For instance, data collected from criminals could potentially be used for 
the study of genetic disposition for violence,58 or genetic samples collected from 
military personnel could be used to identify men thought to be predisposed to 
homosexual behavior.59
Various legal measures taken in the United States attempt to address these 
fears in the public sector. Participants in public sector DNA collections are protected 
by the constitutional right to privacy, 60  the Fourth Amendment (in cases of 
55
 U.K. Human Genetics Commission, supra note 28, at 12-13.
56
 McEwen, supra note 3, at 232-238.
57
 McEwen, id., at 236-240.
58
 McEwen, id., at 237-238. For more on the potential threats of studies on genetic determinism and 
predisposition for violence behavior conducted in prisons see Garland E. Allen, Modern Biological 
Determinism: The Violence Initiative, The Human Genome Project, and the New Eugenics in THE 
PRACTICES OF HUMAN GENETICS (Fortun & Mendelsohn eds., 1999). 
59
 McEwen, id., at 239-240.
60
 Grand, supra note 27, at 2309-2318.
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unreasonable search or seizure),61 the federal Protection of Human Subjects Rule 
(known as the "Common Rule"),62 and the privacy rule under the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).63 The existing system of checks 
and balances subjects "public" repositories of the Federal government and the states to 
increased scrutiny. For instance, by requiring that an Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
will oversee repository practices in the public sector and will insure that the privacy 
and confidentiality of research subjects are protected.64 Yet, not all genetic databases 
and biobanks are under the control of the government, and the fear of misuse should 
not be directed at public repositories alone. In fact, there is a growing number of 
private, commercial repositories holding genetic material and information, which are 
not subject to the existing rules, and these tissue collections are growing rapidly. In 
just over five years commercial biotech companies managed to build private bio-
repositories containing hundred of thousands of human tissue samples, many of which 
are unregulated.65
B. Commercial Databanks
In the past several years a growing number of commercial biotech companies
in the United States have been collecting and storing personal genetic information and 
providing pharmaceutical companies and other research institutions for-a-fee access 
to their collections and bio-libraries. In fact, private biobanks may have an advantage 
61
 Id., at 2289-2309.
62
 45 C.F.R §46. The Common Rule, which applies to research conducted by Federal agencies or using 
Federal money, provides regulations for human subject research and requires that the research 
subjects have a right to be removed from a repository if the information it stores is identifiable. See 
also EISMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 140-141; Winickoff, supra note 11, at 191-192; and Grand, 
supra note 27 (suggesting that there is need for additional regulation for governmental retention of 
biological samples) id., at 2318-2322.
63 See also infra note 80 and the accompanying text.
64 45 C.F.R §46; see also EISMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 126. 
65 See also EISMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 168. 
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over public ones since they can more easily and quickly attract venture capital.66 As a 
result, some academic medical centers have chosen, for financial reasons, to transfer 
their tissue samples to private commercial repositories.67 These newly formed private 
bio-repositories yield various ethical challenges, including that of invasion of privacy. 
Commercial biotech companies provide an array of private services and 
products including: paternity tests, genetic testing for predisposition for certain 
diseases and traits, genealogy and the tracing of origin and ancestry, 68
pharmacogenomics,69 and even private forensics using DNA to establish profiles of 
crime suspects not matching any of the profiles in the Federal CODIS database. 70
DNAPrint Genomics is an example of such a private company providing all of the 
66
 Winickoff & Winickoff, supra note 35, at 1183; and also U.K. Human Genetics Commission 
acknowledging that: "the development of medicines and treatments is largely a commercial 
undertaking and would be severely harmed if commercial access were denied." U.K. Human 
Genetics Commission, supra note 28, at 22.
67 Winickoff, supra note 11, at 207-217.
68
 For instance, DNArints Genomics claims to be able to trace 85% of sub-Saharan Ancestry. See
Marantz-Henig, supra note 7, at 50.
69
 Pharmacogenomics is a new strand of medicine based on genetics. It was made possible through the 
completion of the Human Genome Project and the human genome sequence. The use of genomics in 
the search for new therapeutic treatments, it is anticipated, will allow pharmaceutical companies to 
produce therapies better targeted to specific diseases. See Tanuja V. Garde, Supporting Innovation 
in Targeted Treatments: Licenses of Right to NIH-Funded Research Tools, 11 MICHIGAN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW 249, 252-253 (2005). However, one 
problematic phenomenon observed is the growing focus on what might be termed the genetics of 
race. The drug BiDil, for example, is to be the first "racial drug." The drug developed by NitroMed 
is approved for the treatment of heart failure exclusively in the African-American population after it 
was found to be unsafe for the general public. See also Marantz-Henig, id.; and Stephan Saul, U.S. 
to Review Heart Drug Intended for One Race, THE NEW YORK TIMES (June 13, 2005). Recently, the 
Icelandic company deCode Genetics announced that it detected a variant of a gene that increases the 
risk of heart attack in African-Americans by more than 250%. Nicholas Wade, Genetic Find Stirs 
Debate on Race-Baced Medicine, THE NEW YORK TIMES at A14 (November 11, 2005).
70
 In 2003 DNAPrint Genomics assisted the law-enforcement officials of Louisiana in allocating a 
serial killer. While the police, based on the FBI profile, was looking for a white male aged 25 to 35, 
the DNA Print indicated that the suspect is most likely African-American. DNAPrint's DNA Witness 
Test Provided Break in the Louisiana Multi-Agency Homicide Task Force Serial Killer Case (June 5, 
2003) available at http://www.dnaprint.com/welcome/press/press_recent/2003/june_5/ (last visited
January 2006); for a similar event that took place in Colorado see DNAWitness™ Used to Guide the 
Investigation of the ‘97 rape and murder of Susannah Chase (January 29, 2004) available at 
http://www.dnaprint.com/welcome/press/press_recent/2004/january_29/ (last visited January 2006); 
and in California: DNA Witness Used to Guide the Investigation in Trail Side Murder Case in 
Concord, California (October 14,  2003), available at 
http://www.dnaprint.com/welcome/press/press_recent/2003/october_14/ (last visited January 2006).
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abovementioned services for a fee.71 Private forensics is especially problematic. The 
U.K. Human Genetics Commission recommended that the police and other official 
bodies should not have access to genetic research databases so as not to deter people 
from taking part in research projects, which are important for the understanding of the 
human genome.72 Similarly, should the public fear that the private data they entrust to 
these private companies for research or personal purposes may be used for a different 
goal than the one they agreed to, e.g., for police work and records, public trust will be 
compromised and research may be hindered. 
For the most part, private genetic databases have one of two purposes.73 The 
first is clinical, providing for-a-fee service for individuals who are potentially at risk 
for certain genetic disorders or for individuals who desire to determine their genetic 
routes and origins. The other is for the purpose of conducting research for the 
development of future medical products and treatments.74 In order to provide these 
services, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies have recently begun to create 
their own private bio-repositories consisting of genetic information and tissue samples. 
Genomics Collaborative, Inc., a privately-held biotechnology company 
established in 1998 and located in Cambridge, Massachusetts, claims to have in its 
possession a repository containing 500,000 tissue and DNA samples from 120,000 
people from all over the world.75 Ardais Corporation, a clinical genomics company 
founded in 1999, entered into agreements with several hospitals in the United States 
71 See DNAPrint Genomics' homepage at http://www.dnaprint.com/index.html (last visited January
2006).
72
 U.K. Human Genetics Commission, supra note 28, at 13.
73
 McEwen, supra note 3, at 240-242.
74
 One trend observed is the growing focus on the genetics of race. The drug BiDil, for example, is to 
be the first "racial drug." The drug developed by NitroMed is approved for the treatment of heart 
failure exclusively in the African-American population, after it was found to be unsafe for the 
general public. See also, supra note 69. 
75 See Genomics Collaborative Fact Sheet, available at: 
http://www.genomicsinc.com/Genomics_Collaborative_Fact_Sheets.pdf (last visited January 2006); 
and also Mark D. Uehling, Blood, Sweat, and Tissue, BIO-IT WORLD (March 17, 2004) at: 
http://www.bioitworld.com/archive/031704/blood.html (last visited January 2006).
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including Duke University Medical Center in Durham and Maine Medical Center in 
Portland, in order to broaden and advance its library of tissue samples and information. 
Under these agreements Ardais receives the remains of tissue samples from surgical 
or other medical procedures, which are to be used for its own research and 
commercial purposes. The samples received by Ardais are further linked to coded 
information from the patient's medical records provided by the hospitals. 76  It is 
estimated that the Ardais biobank library – the Biomaterial and Information for 
Genomic Research (BIGR™) Library – contains approximately 220,000 tissue 
samples collected from more than 15,000 donors. 77  Ardais has commercial 
agreements with more than 25 pharmaceutical companies, granting them access to this 
biomaterial library.78
However, despite the magnitude of private commercial genetic repositories, 
and the far reaching implications they may have on personal privacy due to the highly 
sensitive medical and genetic information they contain, these privately held biobanks
are barely regulated at the national level. The Common Rule79 applies only to research 
conducted by Federal agencies or to research conducted by non-Federal agencies 
using Federal money; and the regulations issued under HIPAA provide only a 
minimum level of protection for health information.80 First, the HIPAA regulations do 
not apply to all entities but only to "covered entities," 81 namely health plans,82 health 
76
 Winickoff, supra note 11, at 207-217.
77
 Uehling, supra note 75. 
78
 Ardais Corporation Announces Agreements with AstraZeneca for Access to Clinical Samples (Feb. 
4, 2003), at http://www.ardais.com/news-events/press-releases.shtml (last visited January 2006).
79
 45 C.F.R. §46.101(a). See also supra note 62.
80 SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 50, at 210-217.
81
 45 C.F.R. §§160.102-160.103
82
 A "health plan" is defined as "an individual or group plan that provides, or pays the costs of, medical 
care." 45 C.F.R. §160.103.
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care clearinghouses,83 and health care providers.84 While medical centers, such as the 
ones providing tissue sample to Ardais, are classed as "covered entities" under 
HIPAA, it is not clear that the privately held bio-repositories themselves fall under 
any of these categories. Companies receiving their samples from hospitals, as does 
Ardais Corporation, may be considered "business associates" of health care providers, 
but this does not provide direct protection under the privacy rule, and the scope of 
protection entailed is rather vague.85 It is unclear, for example, that such protection 
would apply in the event the company faces bankruptcy.86 Furthermore, as long as 
the information is in a de-identified format, as is the case in most bio-repositories, the 
regulations do not apply to it, even if the de-identification is not permanent and can be 
reversed.87
Even if regarded as applicable to private biotech companies that are creating 
bio-libraries for their research and commercial purposes, the HIPAA regulations do 
not address several key issues, including ownership, security, and transfer of the data,
which are crucial to the adequate protection of personal genetic privacy and to the 
autonomy of the research subjects. Thus, in the absent of sufficient Federal
protections and rather than relying on free market forces and consumer power to 
83
 A "health care clearinghouse" is defined as "a public or private entity that processes health 
information into various formats – either into a standard format or into specialized formats for the 
need of specific entities." 45 C.F.R. §160.103.
84 A "health care provider" is defined as "…a provider of medical or health services… and any other 
person or organization who furnishes, bills, or is paid for health care in the normal course of 
business." 45 C.F.R. §160.103.
85
 Pew Internet and American Life Project, Exposed Online: Why the New Federal Health Privacy 
Regulation Doesn't Offer Much Protection  to Internet Users, 16 (November 2001) available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_HPP_HealthPriv_report.pdf (last visited January 2006).
86 Id. See also infra section II.C.5. 
87
 45 C.F.R. §164.502(d)(2). If the information becomes re-identified it becomes subject to the 
regulations. Id. See also Mark A. Rothstein, Expanding the Ethical Analysis of Biobanks, 3 
JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS 89, 91-92 (2005).
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insure the safekeeping of this sensitive data and material,88 there is need to formulate
industry-specific, self-regulated, fair information practices.89
C. Self-Regulation
Self-regulation 90  includes the three traditional components of government 
regulation – legislation, enforcement, and adjudication – only at least one of these 
components is carried out by the private sector; not the government.91 There are 
various benefits to self-regulation.92 First, self-regulation is considered to be quicker 
and easier to achieve compared to government regulation as it is less subject to 
political backlashes. As a result it is also cheaper.93 Second, self-regulation is more 
flexible than government regulation. This is important particularly when dealing with 
new technologies that tend to evolve more quickly than the government operates.94
Third, self-regulation can be designed to better fit the needs of specific industries,
such as the biotechnology industry. Fourth, it is argued that self-regulation, which is 
developed by peers, provides better incentives to comply with. Fifth, self-regulation 
may be particularly useful "where the rules or adjudicatory procedures differ from the 
88
 Consumer power may be particularly problematic because of the sensitive nature of genetics and the 
high transaction costs involved.
89 See also SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 105 on the importance of fair information practices in the 
information age. 
90
 The term "self-regulation" may have different meanings to it: "At one end of the spectrum, the term 
is used quite narrowly, to refer only to those instances where the government has formally delegated 
the power to regulate, as in the delegation of securities industry oversight to the stock exchanges. At 
the other end of the spectrum, the term is used when the private sector perceives the need to regulate 
itself for whatever reason – to respond to consumer demand, to carry out its ethical beliefs, to 
enhance industry reputation, or to level the market playing field – and does so. See Irving, supra
note 31.   
91
 Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
711, 714-715 (1999).
92 See also Campbell, id., at 715-717.
93
 Critics of self-regulation criticize this point, arguing that self-regulation simply shifts the cost of 
regulation from the government to the private sector, which may not be willing to commit the 
needed financial resources in order to obtain vigorous self-enforcement. See Campbell, id., at 718.
94 See also Llewellyn J. Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or Self-Regulation: Social 
Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance in Cyberspace, 6 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 475, 509-510 (1997); and Gal Eschet, FIPs and PETs for RFID: Protecting 
Privacy in the Web of Radio Frequency Identification, 45 JURIMETRICS JOURNAL 301, 323 (2005).
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surrounding community or the rules of the surrounding community are inapplicable," 
a phenomenon which is typical to the online environment.95 As a result of these 
benefits self-regulation is argued to be more efficient compared to government 
regulation.96 Critics of self-regulation, on the other hand, question the incentives the 
industry has to regulate itself and whether self-regulation in fact gives sufficient 
attention to the needs of the public, rather than promoting the industry's own business 
and economic goals.97 Nonetheless, with proper incentives from the government as 
well as the market, in addition to some supervision by the government, self-regulation 
should be able to provide better privacy protections in the genetic realm than the 
existing ones, designed for the specific needs of this domain.
The purpose of establishing fair information practices, implemented directly 
by the industry, is to promote and protect personal privacy in bio-repositories and 
genetic databases and to insure coherent "best practices" among both public and 
private repositories, best practices which are currently lacking.98 The key principles of 
fair information practices, as set out by the 1973 report of the Secretary of the United 
States Department of Housing, Education, and Welfare (HEW)99 and the 1980 privacy 
guidelines issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD)100 are: notice, choice, access, security, and enforcement.101 These plus some 
of the more specific issues pertaining to genetic information and genetic privacy –
95
 Campbell, supra note 91, at 717.
96 See Campbell, id., at 715-716.
97
 For these and additional criticism on self-regulation see Campbell, id., at 717-719.
98
 The incoherent practices taken by the different companies and institutions managing bio-repositories 
is evident from infra table 1. See also EISMAN ET AL., supra note 35. 
99
 Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, Report of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on 
Automated Personal Data Systems (July 1973), available at: 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/ (last visited January 2006).
100
 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal data (1980) at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited 
January 2006).
101 See Eschet, supra note 94, at 324-325.
Yael Bregman-Eschet
Genetic Databases and Biobanks: Who Controls our Genetic Privacy?
24
such as questions of ownership and transferability102 – are insufficiently regulated at 
the present time and require further consideration.
1) Property Rights in Genetic Information
As science and technology advance, and with the growing understanding of 
the human genome, genetic information may reveal great amounts of highly personal 
sensitive information. Because of this, adequate protection for genetic information is 
needed to safeguard one's privacy interests, autonomy, and dignity. The question is, 
should the law recognize property rights to one's genetic information in order to 
enhance the protection granted to it, or does the right to privacy provide sufficient 
protection? 
The famous court decision in the case of Moore v. the Regents of the 
University of California103 did not recognize the existence of a patient's property 
rights to bodily parts once removed from the patient's body.104 Moore was treated at 
the Medical Center of the University of California at Los Angeles for hairy-cell 
leukemia. In the course of treatment Moore's spleen was removed and was later used 
by the treating physician to establish a cell-line derived from Moore's T-lymphocytes. 
The cell line, which had promising research uses, was then patented by the 
University.105 Moore claimed to have property interests in his removed spleen and 
hence also in the patented cell line. 106 The majority opinion, rejecting Moore's 
conversion claim, explained that granting such property interests to the individual 
would unnecessarily hinder medical research, and thus would harm society as a 
102 The question of transfer of sensitive medical information to insurance companies and employers is 
covered by the HIPPA regulations, and is forbidden under it, but the regulations do not address the 
question of transfer of medical and genetic data to a third party that is neither an employer nor an 
insurance company. 
103
 Moore v. the Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
104
 Id., at 134-142.
105 Id. 
106
 Id.
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whole. 107  One's privacy and autonomy interests, the majority stated, can be 
sufficiently protected via fiduciary duty and informed consent and thus there is no 
need to resort to property rights that would inflict additional costs on society.108 In 
contrast, in dissenting opinions, Judge Mosk argued that recognizing ownership 
interests in tissues "would give patients an affirmative right of participation,"109 and 
Judge Brousard added that the law of conversion protects a patient's right to control 
the future use of his organs.110
Is genetic information different from body parts? Should an individual have 
the ability to protect her genetic information via property rights? It could be claimed 
that each individual DNA is unique and belongs to the person from whom it was 
derived,  thus recognizing ownership rights in genetic information.111 A similar claim 
made by Moore with regard to his spleen was rejected by the Majority opinion, 
concluding that a person does not have property interests in her removed body parts. 
It could also be argued that since the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
recognized gene sequences as patentable subject matter,112 thus granting researchers 
property rights over human DNA fragments,113 there is no restriction to grant such 
rights to individuals. However, applying the majority's argumentation in the Moore
case also seems to reject granting property interests in genetic information to the 
107
 Id., at 142-147.
108
 Id., at 142-147. 
109 Id., at 181.
110
 Id., at 155.
111 Allen, supra note 10, at 49-51. 
112 Patents on gene sequences are granted as long as they show "specific and substantial utility that is 
credible." See ANDREWS, MEHLMAN, & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 1, at 162-163.
113 For further discussion on the patenting of genes see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role 
of Patens in Appropriating the Value of Gene Sequences, 49 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 783 (2000); 
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); and Melissa L. Sturges, Who Should Hold Property 
Rights to the Human Genome? An Application of the Common Heritage of Humankind, 13 
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 219 (1997). 
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individual to whom the information pertains, a position that has been repeated in the 
legal literature for various reasons.114
For one, granting the individual property rights over genetic information could 
impede genetic research by increasing the transaction costs of obtaining access to 
genetic material and information, which is a growing part of today's medical 
research. 115  Secondly, it has been claimed that treating genetic information as a 
commodity, i.e., granting property rights in the individual, disregards personhood 
values and interests in the self, rather than enhancing its protection. 116 Thirdly, 
property rights do not seem to be adequate to protect personal information, primarily 
because, unlike other types of property, we wish personal information to be free of 
alienability.117 Privacy concerns should allow the individual to prohibit the retransfer 
of personal information from its holder to a third party, and be in a position to bind 
the new recipient with the same constraints that applied to the original holder of the 
information. 118 Traditional proprietary protection is therefore inadequate for
protecting personal data such as genetic information.119
114 See Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
359 (2000) (stating that: "we should adopt the language of privacy rather than that of property when 
we seek to protect self-ownership without suggesting that rights in the human body can be conveyed 
to others and when we wish to distinguish gifts of the body to family members from sale to 
strangers"). Id., at 434-435; and also Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward 
a Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 737 (2004); 
and Allen, supra note 10.
115 See Moore v. the Regents of the University of California, supra note 103; and also Heller & 
Eisenberg, supra note 113.
116 Suter, supra note 114, at 745-747; Allen, supra note 10, at 49-51.
117 See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property, 52 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1125, 1137-
1138 (2000); Suter, id., at 800-801. 
118 See also Schwartz, supra note 12, at 2090-2094 (advocating for a "hybrid inalienability" model that 
permits individuals to trade their personal information while placing limitations on its future uses, 
rather than viewing property rights as automatically entailing free alienability). Id., at 2094-2100.
119 Samuelson, supra note 117, at 1138-1139. See also Mark A. Lemley, Private Property, 52 
STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1545, 1554 (arguing against intellectual property rights for personal 
information: "If we want privacy, we must be willing to accept the fact that there is no good 'market 
solution' and endorse some government regulation of the behavior of data collectors. For the reasons 
I have suggested, I think granting property rights in data to individuals is not a plausible solution. In 
particular, it is not a "free market" solution, because we cannot expect the market to allocate those 
billions of rights efficiently.") For a somewhat different view see Schwartz, id. at 2090-2100.
Yael Bregman-Eschet
Genetic Databases and Biobanks: Who Controls our Genetic Privacy?
27
Yet, in order to achieve the same degree of protection that property law grants 
to personal property, the existing privacy protection for personal genetic information 
must be enhanced. Absent meaningful privacy protection measures and meaningful 
constraints on the assembly, use, and transfer of genetic information and bodily 
tissues, one does not have meaningful control and decisional power over her own 
personal genetic information and the uses made of it once in the hands of research or 
commercial institutions.
Put differently, if property rights in bodily tissues and genetic information are 
to be avoided, for moral reasons as well as for the benefit of scientific research and 
the common good, there is a need to strengthen the privacy protection mechanisms 
currently available for genetic information and genetic material. If the industry does 
not want to hinder its own research and scientific advancements by pushing the public 
into a property rights regime in genetic material, it should adopt fair information 
practices that would effectively safeguard the privacy and autonomy of the people 
whose genetic information it collects.120 Additional aspects of genetic information 
collections – such as the sensitivity of the information collected, accessing it, its 
security, and transferability – intensify the need for fair information practices for the 
regulation of genetic databases and biobanks.
2) Identifiable Information
The sensitivity of genetic information has different levels and degrees. The 
more sensitive the information, the greater protection it requires.121 For example, the 
color of one's eyes falls under the definition of personal genetic information,122 but it 
120 See also Campbell, supra note 91, at 715 (noting that "often times, an industry will engage in self-
regulation in an attempt to stave off government regulation"). 
121 Gostin, supra note 24, at 519-521; U.K. Human Genetics Commission, supra note 28, at 4-6, 10-11. 
122 The U.K. Human Genetics Commission defines personal genetic information as: "any information 
about the genetic make-up of an identifiable person, whether it comes from DNA testing or from 
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is not as sensitive as genetic information of a medical nature such as that regarding a 
predisposition for certain diseases like breast cancer or Alzheimer's.123 While the 
latter – if learned – may be the cause for insurance and even employment 
discrimination, the former is unlikely to cause the same effect; hence the difference in 
sensitivity is evident. 
Another important attribute to the sensitivity of the information depends on 
whether the information may be linked to an identifiable person. The European Union 
Directive on Data protection defines "personal data" as: "any information relating to 
an identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable person is 
one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an 
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity." 124   Similarly, the OECD privacy 
guidelines define personal data as "any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable individual (data subject)."125
Because genetic information has various degrees of sensitivity, based largely 
on whether or not the information is identifiable, it is useful to distinguish between 
genetic information collected for clinical purposes and that collected for research 
purposes. In the clinical context, such as genetic testing, the likelihood that the genetic 
information will be easily identifiable is higher than in the research context. Genetic 
information collected for the purpose of clinical tests will usually be directly linked to 
additional identifiable information such as name, address, birth date, diagnosis, and 
any other source (including the details of a person's family history)." U.K. Human Genetics 
Commission, supra note 28, at 5.
123 Id., at 4-5.
124 The Data protection Directive of 1995, article 2.
125 See OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal data (1980), 
supra note 100.
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family history in order to better diagnose, locate, and provide proper treatment to the 
patient.126
On the other hand, if the genetic information is being collected primarily for 
research purposes then it will usually not be directly linked to any identifiable data, 
and therefore, theoretically at least, will pose a lesser risk to the privacy of the 
individual.127 Nonetheless, it is not impossible to link the information to a specific 
person if enough DNA sequences are available, due to the "unique quality" of the 
DNA.128 Moreover, often times the option to link genetic information, obtained for 
research purposes, to an identifiable person will be retained by the research 
institutions, so as to have the ability to contact the person in the event a genetic 
disorder is discovered, or in case further medical information is needed.129 Linkage to 
medical records may also reveal indirect identifiable information as well as certain 
demographic data.130 Hence, privacy protection measures must also be taken with 
regard to information that is not directly identifiable, but has the potential to be 
identified. 
The HIPAA regulations, previously mentioned, apply only to identifiable 
information.131As a result, a considerable amount of genetic data available in private 
bio-repositories and which is de-identified, is not subject in its de-identified form to 
the HIPAA regulations and their privacy requirements.132 A number of private bio-
repositories have implemented HIPPA requirements, despite claiming that they are 
not obliged to do so, and it has been found that others even implemented more 
126 McEwen, supra note 3, at 240-242.
127 McEwen, id., at 240-242.
128 See Murray, supra note 19, at 63; Gostin, supra note 24, at 504.
129 The U.K. Biobank, for example, gives the participants the option to choose whether or not they want   
to be informed in such event. See U.K. Human Genetics Commission, supra note 28, at 17.
130 Rothstein, supra note 87, at 90.
131 45 C.F.R. §164.502(d)(2).
132 It should be noted that once the information is re-identified, it becomes subject to the regulations. Id.   
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stringent practices than those required under HIPPA.133 This may indicate a need for 
more regulation than currently available, regulation that may be achieved via 
formulation of fair information practices. Adopting clear guidelines is also likely to 
enhance public trust and the willingness to take part in research projects.134
3) Access
As part of their services, commercial bio-repositories frequently offer 
pharmaceutical companies and research institutions access to their private bio-
libraries. This is necessary to the advancement of research and might remind some of 
the traditional collaborative science, or be perceived as a new form of open-source 
access to biotechnology.135 Nonetheless, this also requires extra caution in order to 
protect the personal privacy of the data subjects.
It is important to have guidelines as to who may have access, and to what 
types of information. Third parties that are given permission to research the 
information stored in biobanks or genetic databases should only have access to 
unidentifiable information that cannot be re-identified without the prior consent of the 
individual. 
Specific guidelines as to when encrypted data may be de-encrypted and by 
whom, should be formed. All employees with access to sensitive data must adhere to 
confidentiality agreements or policies that are to be strictly enforced. 136  Only a 
restricted number of personnel should have access to identifiable information and to 
the linking key between the anonymized genetic information and the person to whom 
it pertains. There should also be limitations set on the uses of this information, so as 
133 EISMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 130-132.
134 See also Rothstein, supra note 87, at 94-95.
135 See also David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin's Genome, or Coase and Open Source Biotechnology, 
18 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 167 (Fall 2004).
136 U.K. Human Genetics Commission, supra note 28, at 18.
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to ensure that the information is being used for the research purposes agreed to by the 
research subject rather than unwarranted uses that may lead to, for instance,
employment or insurance discrimination.  
4) Security
In addition, and of no less importance, genetic databanks and bio-repositories
need be secured from unauthorized access (both in the physical as well as the virtual 
worlds). As table 1 indicates, currently there is no single uniform standard for the 
protection of sensitive genetic information. For instance, while some companies 
choose to encrypt the information they collect, others do not, and even encrypted 
information is potentially exposed to decoding.137
The existing variation in bio-repositories and lack of uniform standards not 
only impede research by making it more difficult to compare results from specimens 
taken from different banks,138 but also undermine the privacy interests of the research 
subjects since it is more difficult and costly for them to find out what measures are 
taken by each institute, and which measures would provide adequate privacy 
protection. In other words, the diversity in security measures taken by different 
institutions imposes additional transaction costs on data subjects who care for their 
privacy thus making it more difficult for the market to regulate itself towards 
implementing stronger privacy protections.139
137 See also the criticism voiced on the encryption mechanism adopted by the Icelandic Health Sector 
Database Act. Infra note 212 and the accompanying text.
138 ELISA EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 32; Mark D. Uehling, Study: Federal Banks are Lagging, BIO-IT, 
available at http://www.bio-itworld.com/archive/031704/blood_sidebar_4640.html (last visited 
January 2006).
139 Under a market approach it is assumed that consumers would prefer to do business with those 
companies that better protect their privacy. See also Eschet, supra note 94, at 321.
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Table 1: Tissue Repositories Security Measures
# of human 
specimens
searchable 
at secure 
online site
Access 
to 
quality 
control 
data
Encryption 
data 
identifying 
donor
Overseen 
by ethics 
advisory 
board
Requires 
SOPs140
for tissue 
collection
Armed Forces 
Institute of 
Pathology
92 million X
Genomics 
Collaborative
500,000 partial X X X
Ardais Corp. 220,000 X X X X X
National Cancer 
Institute's 
Cooperative Human 
Tissue Network
107,000 partial partial X X X
Mayo Clinic 
Prostate Specialized 
Program of Research 
Excellence (SPORE)
3,000 X X X
University of 
Pittsburgh Health 
Sciences Tissue 
Bank
1,100 X X X X X
Source: bio-itworld.com at http://www.bio-itworld.com/archive/031704/blood_sidebar_4641.html 
Appropriate security measures should not only restrict external access to the 
information by hackers, but also the number of interior personnel that have access to 
personal information, particularly identifiable or potentially identifiable 
information.141 Data retrieved from the linkage of personal information and databases 
and data that has greater potential of being identifiable should be subject to the 
highest form of security measures, including data encryption, and only a restricted 
number of personnel should have access to it on a need-to-know basis.
5) Transferability
For commercial biotech companies, their databases, containing the genetic 
information of individuals, are one of their most valuable assets. One major concern is 
that absent proper restrictions, companies would treat genetic databases and biobanks 
as they would treat any other commercial asset, despite their sensitive nature. For 
140 Standard Operating Procedures. 
141 EISMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 121-126, 135.
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instance, the companies might sell their databases in case of financial difficulty, or 
simply for the sake of making profit, just as they might with any other valuable asset
they possess.142
The issue of genetic databases as a commercial asset raises several difficult 
problems. First, genetic databases contain highly sensitive information which, in some
cases, can be directly linked to specific individuals whether they chose to be part of 
the database (as in the case of voluntary genetic testing) or not (as in the case of 
forensic databases). Second, it is not clear that the company collecting the information 
is indeed the owner of that information,143 and thus whether it is free to sell or transfer
said information at its will. It has been suggested by scholars that the holders of 
medical data should be considered as merely "trustees," not owners, of the data, a 
position that places greater restrictions and responsibilities over the authorized uses of 
the data and puts limitations on its future disclosure. 144  At the very least, the 
individuals to whom the information pertains should be able to place limitation on 
future uses of their genetic information in order to maintain their autonomy 
interests.145
If a company decides to sell its genetic databases to another entity, the privacy 
of this sensitive, potentially identifiable information is jeopardized. A similar concern 
exists with regard to personal user information collected, for example, by online 
142 For additional examples of the commodification of personal information in the technology age see
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 2060-2069, 2127-2128. For a more general discussion of this trend see
THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil W. Netanel eds., 2002).
143 See generally SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 78-79.
144 For more on holders of health information as "trustees" see Schwartz, supra note 15, at 57-59; and 
also Winickoff & Winickoff, supra note 35, at 1182-1183 (advocating for a charitable trust model 
for genomic biobanks in order to, among other things, insure "longevity" and prevent the transfer of 
genetic material without the prior informed consent of the tissue donor). See also SOLOVE, id., at 
102-104 (suggesting that companies that collect and store personal information stand in a fiduciary 
relationship with the individuals to whom the information pertains). 
145 See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 2094-2100.
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retailers.146 This information, which includes the purchasing habits of consumers, 
billing information, and similar consumer profiles, is subject to ownership transfer in 
the event of bankruptcy or other financial problems faced by the companies.147 But, 
while the privacy policies of such dot-com companies often address the question of 
transfer of sensitive information to third parties,148 DNAPrint Genomics, for example, 
which provides an array of genetic services from paternity rests to private forensics,149
fails to specifically address this scenario in its Code of Ethics.150 In the absence of a 
Federal law prohibiting such sale of personal genetic information and in view of 
previous court decisions allowing the transfer of personal information from one entity 
to another,151 the sale or transfer of genetic information to a third party seems like a
realistic probability. 
In fact, at the end of March 2005 Ardais Corporation and Cytomyx Holdings 
plc, a life science company based in the United Kingdom, announced their newly 
formed collaboration. Under the Collaboration, Cytomyx will acquire and gain control 
over the Ardais biorepository containing over 130,000 samples.152 While the press 
release announcing the collaboration and transfer of ownership over the Ardais 
biorepository assured that all former business customers would continue to have 
access to and use the samples in the biobank, nothing was said with regard to the 
146 See also SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 83. 
147 See In re Toysmart.com, LLC (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000) in which the court concluded that Toysmart 
could sell its consumers' personal information database despite its privacy policy which stated that 
"personal information voluntarily submitted by visitors to our site, such as name, address, billing 
information and shopping preferences, is never shared with a third party" (emphasis added). 
148 See for example the privacy policy of Amazon.com that specifically stipulates that "…in the 
unlikely event that Amazon.com, Inc., or substantially all of its assets are acquired, customer 
information will of course be one of the transferred asset." See
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/browse/-/468496/102-0508312-4688103 (last visited 
January 2006).
149 See supra note 71 and the accompanying text.
150 See DNAPrint Genomics, Code of Business Conduct and Ethics, available at
http://www.dnaprint.com/2003/corporate/ethics (last visited January 2006).
151 See In re Toysmart.com, supra note 147.
152 Ardais and Cytomyx Announce Translational Medicine Collaboration (March 30, 2005), at 
http://www.ardais.com/news-events/press-releases.shtml (last visited January 2006).
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safekeeping of the privacy interests of those whose medical and genetic data have just 
been transferred to a new entity, located outside of the United States.153
Ironically, it is likely that the personal information now controlled by a British 
company is actually better protected than before, because the European Union 
generally provides broader privacy protections than the United States.154 However, 
absent legal restrictions on the transfer of genetic information abroad, future 
collaborations may end with transfer of genetic information to countries that offer a 
lesser level of privacy protection compared to that available in the United States, or 
even no privacy protection at all; a situation that should not be permitted. 
It may be argued that transfer of ownership in genetic databases and biobanks 
does not necessarily affect the privacy interests of individuals, particularly if the
information transferred in coded, or that the market powers are sufficient to safeguard 
privacy interests, but this is not reassuring. First, changes in ownership make it more 
difficult for the data subjects to control the uses made with the information and
increases the possibility that the information may be used for purposes others than the 
ones agreed for. Second and as previously explained, pure market forces are unlikely 
to give adequate remedy due to market failure in the form of high transaction costs 
that prevent consumers from preferring those companies that implement strong 
privacy protections. 155   Moreover, in the computerized world in which we live, 
personalized data can easily and cheaply be transmitted from one country to the other. 
Absent any meaningful regulation this could further undermine personal privacy. This 
scenario is especially plausible when the data is being controlled by a private, 
commercial company that primarily seeks to maximize its profits. Lastly, the same 
type of alienability argumentation that sees personal information as different from 
153 See id. 
154 See infra note 157 and the accompanying text. 
155 See also supra note 139 and the accompanying text.
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other types of property,156 applies here. If personal information should be free of 
alienability, then the data subjects should be able to prohibit the transfer of 
information pertaining to them to third parties.
For similar reasons and in order to protect privacy interests, the European 
Union permits the transfer of personal information  only to states that grant sufficient 
privacy protection measures;157 and the Icelandic parliament, which was willing to 
provide access to all of its national's medical records to a private company, insisted 
that the company be located in Iceland, and that the data not leave the country.158
However, such limitations are largely absent in the United States, especially when 
dealing with private companies. As a result, research subjects are lacking control and 
further assurances over their personal information and its uses. Hence, limitations on 
the transfer of genetic information including with respect to its location, the entity 
receiving it, and its future usages, are required.159
In sum, there is need for more scrutiny to be applied not just towards Federal 
or national public repositories, but also towards private commercial entities. This 
could be achieved through the establishment of fair information practices. At the same 
time, more supervision should be directed at collaboration initiatives between the state 
and private commercial companies and the flow of information from the public to the 
private sector. The following section will analyze the privacy threats posed by these 
new collaborations using the Icelandic Health Sector Database as a case study.
156 See supra note 117. 
157 See the European Data Protection Directive of 1995, article 25.
158 Act on a Health Sector Database, no. 139/1998 (passed on Dec. 17, 1998) (Hereinafter: the HSD 
Act), article 10. English version available at http://www.informatica-
juridica.com/anexos/anexo610.asp (last visited January 2006).
159 See also FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE, CONSEQUENCES OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY 
REVOLUTION, chapter 10 The Political Control of Biotechnology, 181-194 (2002) (Stressing the 
need for regulation, particularly international regulation, to control biotechnological advances).
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III. PRIVATE – PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS IN THE GENETIC ERA
A. The Icelandic Health Sector Database
There is an extensive debate about whether private or governmental control 
over personal data is more intrusive and which requires more precautions. The 
traditional American thought is more wary of the government;160 while its European 
counterparts have more faith in government and less in industry. The former, as a 
result, places greater restrictions on the government than on private industry. 161
However, as recently suggested by legal scholars Michael Birnhack and Niva Elkin-
Koren, we must now also be conscious of a new player, a partnership between the two, 
referred by them as the "Invisible Handshake" between the government and the 
private industry.162
The Icelandic Health Sector Database Act, under which the Icelandic 
government granted a private, for-profit, American company access to all of Iceland's
160 See, for example, Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother's Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and other 
Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 NORTH 
CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL REGULATION 595, 629-630 (2004) 
(Stating: "Our Nation also has a deep suspicion of government action and motives, while 
maintaining trust in the action of the private sector. … Libertarians and conservatives…have argued 
that government collection, use, and disclosure of information presents more risk commercial 
collection because the government has the power to arrest, imprison, and even to execute citizens. 
Commercial entities, although they hold our mortgages and often control our employment, arguably 
present less risk to our autonomy.").
161 See also Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
717, 730-731 (2001) (stating that: "…the United States has, in recent years, left the protection of 
privacy to markets rather than the law. In contrast, Europe treats privacy as a political imperative 
anchored in fundamental human rights. … This vision of governance generally regards the state as 
the necessary player to frame the social community in which individuals develop and in which 
information practices must serve individual identity. … Indeed, citizens trust government more than 
the private sector with personal information.").
162 Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The Reemergence of the State 
in the Digital Environment, 8 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 6 (Summer 2003) stating 
that: "Whether the big brother we distrust is government and its agencies, or multinational 
corporations the emerging collaboration between the two in the online environment produces the 
ultimate threat." Id. at 1. (Birnhack & Elkin-Koren point to the rise of the Invisible Handshake 
between the government and the private industry in the Information Technology realm, primarily the 
growing use by the government of the tools developed by the industry for its own commercial and 
legal needs). See also Hoofnagle, supra note 160, at 630 (arguing that the "distinction between the 
risks of government and commercial privacy risk is no longer tenable. Commercial actors provide 
personal information to the government in a number of contexts, and often with astonishing 
alacrity"). In the genetic context the information flow between the private and public sectors occurs 
mainly in the direction of the private sector from the public one, in return for financial compensation. 
See also Petersen, supra note 9 and the accompanying text. 
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medical files, along with a license to compile them all into one digital database that is 
linked to genetic information, is a good (some would say alarming) example of the 
new relationship and collaboration between the private and public sectors in the 
context of genetic privacy.
1) The Icelandic Health Sector Database Act
The Icelandic Act on a Health Sector Database163 (the "HSD Act"), enacted in 
December 1998, attracted much attention and criticism since it was first introduced in 
1997. The Act establishes the Icelandic Health Sector Database on an opt-out basis,164
and aims to, as stated in the Act itself, "authorize the creation and operation of a 
centralized database of non-personally identifiable health data with the aim of 
increasing knowledge in order to improve health and health services."165 The creation 
of the database and the genealogical research it would allow was believed to be 
especially beneficial. In this regard, the Icelandic population was viewed as a 
particularly good case study because of its genetically homogenous nature, which was 
believed to make it relatively easier to spot genetic variations associated with 
diseases.166
The database, including all health information it contains, is to be managed 
exclusively by a private commercial American company, deCode Genetics Inc. 
("deCode"). In fact, the Health Sector Database Bill was drafted on the basis of a 
163 The HSD Act, supra note 158. 
164 The HSD Act, id, article 8.
165 The HSD Act, id., article 1.
166 The validity of this argument is somewhat questionable because humans share 99.9% of the genome 
and most genotype variation is found within races or ethnic groups, not between them. See also
Henry T. Greely, Iceland's Plan for Genomics Research: Facts and Implications, 40 JURIMETRICS 
JOURNAL 153, 159-160 (Winter 2000) (listing six additional benefits for conducting this type of 
research in Iceland: 1) Iceland's relatively small size; 2) the general support granted by the Icelandic 
people to medical research; 3) an organized national health coverage that collected information and 
tissue samples since the first half of the 20th century; 4) the obsession the Icelandic people have with 
genealogy; 5) all Icelandic people experience relatively similar environment; and 6) the existence of 
a political will to allow large scale genetic research).   
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proposal made by deCode itself.167 The Bill was criticized on numerous accounts 
including that it lacked provisions for obtaining informed consent of individuals 
whose information was included in the database, undermined scientific freedom, 
restrained competition, eroded the doctor-patient confidential relationship, and 
invaded the people's right to privacy.168 Nonetheless, in December 1998, shortly after 
first introduced, the Bill was enacted by the Icelandic parliament, the Althingi. 
DeCode was granted a 12-year license169 to construct an electronic database 
for all health records available in the Icelandic national health care system, namely, 
the health records of approximately 270,000 citizens, as well as records dating back to 
the first half of the 20th century.170 The subjects of the database include the deceased, 
children, and incompetent individuals, all of whom cannot legally provide informed 
consent to this move. This electronic database was designed to contain extensive 
medical information including: records on the individuals' health, their medical 
treatments, lifestyles, social circumstances, employment, and family.171 DeCode was 
further authorized to link this health information to two additional databases: Iceland's 
genealogy database and to other genetic data collected from volunteers from within 
the Icelandic population.172
167 Ragnar Aalsteinsson, The Constitutionality of the Icelandic Act on a Health Sector Database, in 
SOCIETY AND GENETIC INFORMATION: CODES AND LAWS IN THE GENETIC ERA, 203, 203-204 (Judit 
Sándor ed., 2003). Due to numerous criticisms the Bill was substantially amended from the original 
draft. One of the new provisions added was the opt-out option. See id. For a list of additional 
changes made from the first to the second draft of the HSD Act see Greely, id., at 170-171. 
168 Aalsteinsson, id., at 204-205.
169 The HSD Act, supra note 158, article 5(9).
170 Greely, supra note 166, at 159-161.
171 Ragnhildur Guðmundsdóttir v. The State of Iceland, No. 151/2003 (November 27, 2003), part IV. 
English version available at 
http://www.mannvernd.is/english/lawsuits/Icelandic_Supreme_Court_Verdict_151_2003.pdf (last 
visited January 2006).
172 See The HSD Act, supra note 158, article 10; and also Winickoff, supra note 11; and Kaiser, supra
note 7. According to the Biobanks Act of 2001, any patient whose biological sample has been taken 
is presumed to have consented to the storage of the sample in a biobank for the purpose of scientific 
research, unless the patient explicitly indicates otherwise. See Aalsteinsson, supra note 167, at 208-
209. 
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Put another way, the HSD Act granted deCode, a private commercial company, 
presumed consent (or "blanket consent"173) to collect the medical records of the 
entirety of the Icelandic population,174 compile them in one electronic database, and 
combine this data with available genetic information, unless specifically indicated 
otherwise by each individual in a pre-defined six-month window.175
2) Privacy Protection under the HSD Act
The HSD Act raises many concerns including the commercialization of 
personal medical data, and intrusion upon medical privacy. 176  The fact that the 
government, which was entrusted with this sensitive information for generations, was 
willing to transfer the people's medical records to a private for-profit company 
without obtaining explicit individual consent for this move is very troubling. This is 
so especially since private commercial companies are likely to have different goals at 
heart: while the government is expected to act primarily for the benefit of the public 
good, a for-profit company is likely to act on its own economic interests, even when 
such interests conflict with the public welfare. 177  Furthermore, the inadequate 
protection granted in the Act to that information and to the privacy interests of the 
population adds insult to injury. 
173 George J. Annas, Rules for Research on Human Genetic Variation – Lessons from Iceland, 342(24) 
THE NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 1830 (June 15, 2000); Jeffrey R. Gulcher & Kári 
Stefánsson, The Icelandic Healthcare Database and Informed Consent, 342(24) THE NEW ENGLAND 
JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 1827 (June 15, 2000).
174 This implied priori consent to transfer medical information to the HSD database is acceptable if the 
information transferred is unidentified, and cannot be linked back to a specific person. This issue 
was central to the Iceland Supreme Court decision in Ragnhildur Guðmundsdóttir v. The State of 
Iceland, supra note 171.
175 The HSD Act provided a six-month grace period beginning with the passage of the Act, in which 
people could choose to opt-out of the project. The HSD Act, supra note 158, article 8. See also infra
section III.A.3.
176 Greely raises five main concerns stemming from the HSD Act: connection to a for-profit firm; lack 
of affirmative informed consent; privacy; exclusive control over the database; and the financial 
terms of the agreement. See Greely, supra note 166, at 176-191. 
177 For a somewhat different view see Greely, supra note 166, at 176-178 (claiming that there is no 
clear answer whether the government or non-profit institutions, such as universities, are better suited 
to operate this type of databases).
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The main benefit of this colossal database, it was argued, was to boost the 
country's economy. 178  Some of the economic benefits emphasized were that the 
project would bring back Icelandic scientists who left the country, and that it would 
jump-start an Icelandic biotech industry.179 However, whether or not the Icelandic 
parliament and the Icelandic people actually made a good deal is highly 
questionable. 180  The country could not meet the expense of establishing such a 
comprehensive database and therefore resorted to a commercial company to do so. 
But because of this, should the database yield the potential value hoped for, the 
Icelandic government's share of the profits will be surprisingly small. 181  The 
justification for the transfer of control over the medical records from medical 
personnel to administrative boards was that the medical records are not subject to 
property rights, but are rather a national resource.182 However, even if the data is a 
national resource it is not clear why one private (American) company – rather than 
Icelandic institutions and companies, the government, and the Icelandic people 
themselves – should be the primary beneficiary. 
Beyond the actual transfer of sensitive information from the government's 
holding to a private, for-profit company without explicit consent, which is 
problematic on its own, the HSD Act does not take sufficient measures to safeguard 
the information stored and the privacy interests that accompany it. The Act does not 
disregard the need for safeguarding privacy; it purports to take several measures 
aimed to protect the privacy interests of the Icelandic citizens. Health information and 
178 See Aalsteinsson, supra note 167, at 205; and also Kaiser, supra note 7, at 1159.
179 Id.
180 See Greely, supra note 166, at 173 (stating that: "the licensee's financial obligations, as stipulated by 
the legislation, are not extensive. … The Act does not provide Iceland with any royalty or other 
share of the licensee's profits, nor does it require the provision of free drugs to Iceland that had been 
part of deCode's agreement with Roche.").  Likewise, granting deCode an exclusive license for a 
period of 12 years may in fact impede other Icelandic research projects by denying access to the 
information contained in the database. Id. at 187; and also Annas, supra note 173. 
181 Greely, id., at 187-191.
182 Aalsteinsson, supra note 167, at 206.
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personal identification information is coded prior to its entry to the database;183 in 
addition, personal identification data undergoes one-way coding that, as promised by 
the Act, cannot be traced by means of a decoding key.184 The process is overseen by 
two governmentally-appointed bodies: the Data Protection Committee, 185  and the 
Committee on the Creation and Operation of a Health Service Database,186 which are 
responsible for monitoring the recording and handling of the information and making
sure that the data is adequately protected and that the privacy interests of the 
population are kept.
But these provisions, it seems, are far from sufficient to safeguard the privacy 
of the Icelandic population. One-way coding of personally identifiable information, 
for instance, is not plausible if the medical records are to be linked to genealogical 
data. The reason being that in order to make this link, someone – either deCode or one 
of the governmental committees – will need to have the decoding key, thus 
undermining the anonymity of the participants. 187   Moreover, if sufficient DNA 
sequence data is stored in the genealogical database, it is theoretically possible to 
identify the individual whose sequence it is, even if her name or other identifiable 
information is removed.188
The HSD Act further grants deCode the authorization to use the medical 
information stored in the database for its "financial profit" as long as the provisions of 
the Act and of the license are followed, 189   or for the research purposes of its 
183 The HSD Act, supra note 158, article 7.
184 The HSD Act, id., article 7. "One-way coding" is defined by the HSD Act as "the transformation of 
words or series of digits into an incomprehensible series of symbols which cannot be traced by 
means of a decoding key." The HSD Act, article 2. 
185 The HSD Act, supra note 158, article 12.
186 The HSD Act, id., articles 10, 12.
187 See Greely, supra note 166, at 183-184.
188 See Murray, supra note 19, at 63; Gostin, supra note 24, at 504.
189
"The licensee is authorized during the period of the license to use the data on the database for 
purposes of financial profit, under the conditions laid down in this legislation and the license." The 
HSD Act, supra note 158, article 10.
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licensees.190 Drug companies may also have access to the database for a fee, and 
academic researchers working on "non-commercial projects" would be able to access 
the information at no cost.191 The Act does not require deCode to receive informed 
consent from individuals in the database for specific research projects, but rather 
leaves the possible uses of the information unspecified, 192  effectively making it 
impossible for the participants in the project to have control over the current and 
future uses of their own medical and genetic information.193
3) Opting Out of the Health Sector Database
An Icelandic citizen who does not wish to be included in the national 
healthcare database must actively opt-out of the project.194 The people of Iceland were 
given a limited, pre-defined transitional period of six months after the passage of the 
HSD Act and prior to the entry of medical data into the Health Sector Database to do 
so.195 As a result, only about 7%-10% of the Icelandic population opted-out of the 
project.196 This low percentage might be indicative of overwhelming support for the 
HSD Act and the Health Sector Database established under it, but it is more likely the 
result of the structure chosen in the form of an opt-out process, advocated by deCode, 
rather than an opt-in system.197 If, in fact, the Health Sector Database enjoys such 
overwhelming support by the public, there should be no reason to object to an opt-in 
190 Winickoff, supra note 11, at 202. 
191 Kaiser, supra note 7, at 1159.
192 The HSD Act, supra note 158, article 10.
193 Winickoff, supra note 11, at 202.
194 The HSD Act, supra note 158, article 8. 
195 Greely, supra note 166, at 172.
196 Kaiser, supra note 7, at 1159; Gulcher & Stefánsson, supra note 173. 
197 See also Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Opting At All: The Fight for Control of Personal 
Information, 74 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW, 1033 (1999) (listing the benefits of an opt-in system 
compared to an opt-out system).
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regime, which will more accurately represent the consent of the people and safeguard 
their autonomy and control over the information collected.198
Individuals who did not opt-out within the provided "grace period" can, 
according to the Act, request "at any time, that either all of their existing or future 
medical information not be entered into the database or that specific information not 
be entered."199 However, the Act does not provide for deletion of information already 
entered into the database, only for preventing the entry of future information.200
The HSD Act is also silent with regard to data collected on the legally 
incompetent, including children and the mentally disabled. Even though children's 
privacy protection has often been regarded as requiring more rigorous regulations 
compared to that of adults,201 the HSD Act chose not to address this segment of the 
population that would be included in the Database. The guardians of the incompetent 
or the parents of children under 18 years of age may opt-out of the project on their 
behalf; in addition, once a child reaches the age of 18 she may independently opt-out 
of the project. But just as the adults who did not opt-out in the initial six-month grace 
period, this act of opting-out once reaching legal adulthood concerns only future data 
that might be entered into the database. Data that has already been stored in the 
database will not be removed or deleted simply because an individual opts out upon 
turning 18, even though she could not do so herself beforehand.202
198 See also Greely, supra note 166, at 180-181; and SOLOVE, supra note 16, at 105-106.
199 The HSD Act, supra note 158, article 8.
200 See Greely, supra note 166, at 178-179; and also Winickoff, supra note 11, at 203; Annas, supra
note 173. Both Winickoff and Annas interpret the Act as making such removal of already existing 
data in database, impossible.
201 See, for example, the Child Online Protection Act of 1998 (COPA) and the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), both of which provide enhanced privacy protection for children in 
the online environment. 
202 Aalsteinsson, supra note 167, at 206-207. However, deCode and the Medical Association of 
Iceland issued a joint statement in which they promised to erase already existing data from the 
database at a patient's request to opt-out. Aalsteinsson, id. 
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In addition, the HSD Act does not directly address the rights of the deceased 
pertaining to their health information, or put differently, the rights of the relatives to 
opt-out on behalf of the deceased and to refuse the transfer of the deceased's health 
information into the database. The latter issue was subject to a legal suit brought 
before the Icelandic Supreme Court.203 The plaintiff, a young woman who asked to 
prevent the transfer of her deceased father's medical records into the Health Sector 
Database, brought suit upon the refusal to do so by the Medical Director of Health of 
Iceland.204 The refusal of the Medical Director of Health was not based only on the 
fact that the HSD Act does not directly address this issue, but also, and primarily, on 
the commentary attached to the bill that indicated that the Act was never intended to 
enable people to prevent the transfer of information of their deceased relatives.205
Although according to Icelandic law, the personal rights of individuals lapse 
on their death unless otherwise stipulated by law,206 the Supreme Court recognized 
that information regarding her father's genetic history and records, may apply also to 
the appellant herself. 207  The fact that genetic information may reveal medical 
information not only pertaining to the subject herself but also to relatives was used to 
argue that genetic information is different and more intrusive than other forms of 
medical information.208 The Supreme Court hence accepted the appellant's argument 
that her constitutional right to privacy209 grants her interest in preventing the transfer 
of her deceased father's medical information to the Health Sector Database.210
203 Ragnhildur Guðmundsdóttir v. The State of Iceland, supra note 171.
204 Id., part I.
205 Id., part I; Aalsteinsson, supra note 167, at 207.
206 Ragnhildur Guðmundsdóttir v. The State of Iceland, id., part II.
207 Id., part II.
208 See also supra note 19 and the accompanying text.
209 The right to privacy is recognized under Paragraph 1 of Article 71 of the Icelandic Constitution. 
210 Ragnhildur Guðmundsdóttir v. The State of Iceland, supra note 171, part II.
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In its analysis of the HSD Act, the Icelandic Supreme Court found additional 
flaws with the Act and its protection of personal privacy; concluding that the one-way 
coding mechanism established by the HSD Act 211 is insufficient for protecting 
individuals' privacy. The Supreme Court's reasoning was two-fold: first, because the 
Act provides no specific guidance as to what type of information must be encrypted in 
this manner; and second, because the license seems to imply that after deletion of the 
name and address of a person, only her identification number needs be encrypted.212
This, according to the Icelandic Supreme Court's opinion, does not adequately protect 
one's privacy interests. 
The Icelandic experience described above provides further support for the 
need to establish and implement fair information practices targeting the accumulation 
of personal genetic information, and the usage and storage of this data. It also 
demonstrates both the risks and benefits stemming from unrestricted flow of 
information between public and private entities, as is further discussed in the 
following section. 
B. Risks and Benefits
To be certain, there are valuable aspects of such collaboration between public 
and private entities. First, if governments hold vast amount of useful medical and 
genetic data, such as the Icelandic medical records 213  or the American National 
Pathology Repository,214 but do not have the resources, the technology, the capacity, 
or the will to take full scientific advantage of it, while private entities have the 
211 See supra note 184.
212 Ragnhildur Guðmundsdóttir v. The State of Iceland, supra note 171, part IV.
213 See supra note 170 and the accompanying text.
214 See supra note 45 and the accompanying text.
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aptitude but not the data,215 then the need for collaboration between the two is evident 
and will benefit science and society. 
Second, private companies that collaborate with public institutions may be 
subject to stricter standards and greater public scrutiny compared to private entities 
acting on their own, thus better safeguarding privacy concerns. For instance, in 
contrast to the United States where there are no real restrictions on the transfer of 
genetic information kept in private bio-repositories,216 the Icelandic Health Sector 
Database Act forbids the transport of the database outside of Iceland, and all of the 
information contained in the database is to be processed in Iceland alone.217 It is 
unlikely that such a broad limitation on the transfer of information would have been 
applicable if it had not been for the involvement of the government in providing the 
data to the Health Sector Database.
Still, these partnerships hold many potential risks to the privacy and autonomy 
of individuals. First, such partnerships give private companies with commercial, 
profit-driven goals access to an immense amount of personal information that the 
government has been entrusted with. It is not clear that individuals would agree to 
contribute their tissue samples and genetic and medical information to private, for-
profit companies without proper compensation. Hence, such transfers of data must be 
authorized by individuals in the form of an active informed consent. 
Second, unless individuals specifically agree to the transfer of information 
from one entity to another, collaborations between public and private entities that 
involve the transfer of DNA samples and medical information undermine the 
autonomy and control of the research subjects. Thirdly, if one views either one of the 
two collaborators – either the private sector or the public sector – as posing a greater 
215 See also Petersen, supra note 9 and the accompanying text.
216 See supra section II.C.5  
217 The HSD Act, supra note 158, article 10. 
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risk to her privacy interest compared to the other, then the transfer of information 
from one sector to the other intensifies this risk in the eyes of the individual. Lastly, 
and perhaps most importantly, commercial companies are likely to have a different set 
of priorities than those of governmental or non-profit organizations, and hence may be 
less fit to be the sole keepers of vast amounts of sensitive, personal information, 
especially if easily linked to other types of personal information.
In order to address these concerns, the transfer of information from one entity 
to another, in all sectors, must be thoughtfully regulated and practiced, and the 
explicit consent of the participants must be obtained. Moreover, it would be useful to 
adopt a trustee model for keepers of genetic information and samples, particularly 
when dealing with privately owned repositories, in order to limit potential misuses. 
The U.K. Biobank, which has internalized much of the criticism voiced on the 
Icelandic Health Sector Database, rejected the commercial model adopted by Iceland, 
and managed to structure a more data-subject friendly approach based on a 
governmental-charitable structure. 
C. Lessons from Iceland: The U.K. Model
Aiming to be the largest population database in the world with human samples
initially collected from 500,000 volunteers, the U.K. Biobank is to be launched in 
early 2006.218 It will consist of a collection of blood and urine samples, information 
regarding height, weight, and blood pressure, and additional information collected via 
a questionnaire form from volunteers aged 40 to 69, and will follow the health of the 
218 See http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about.php (last visited January 2006).
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volunteers for long periods of up to thirty years.219 The information is further intended 
to be linked to each data-subject's medical records.220
The purpose of the project, as indicated by its founders, is to provide a "unique 
resource for ethical research into genetic and environmental factors that impact on 
human health and disease, to improve the health of future generations."221 The bank is 
to be a resource of information for investigating the "causes, courses, and treatments 
of the common severe illnesses, and improving ways of dealing with them,"222 and 
access to its collections will be granted to both research institutions and commercial 
companies in order to facilitate research and promote sharing of data and findings.223
Unlike the Icelandic Health Sector Database, the U.K. Biobank will operate on 
the basis of explicit consent,224 and volunteers will be recruited on the basis of an opt-
in regime. 225  However, conditional consent – consent that allows participants to 
choose which part of the data will be used, by whom, and for what purposes – will not 
be available because of the difficulty of implementing this framework in such a large 
scale database. 226  In the words of the Interim Advisory Group on Ethics and 
Governance that accompanies the project: "participation will have to be all or nothing 
219 See id.
220 Interim Advisory Group on Ethics and Governance, UK Biobank Ethics and Governance 
Framework, Background Document, 3, 7 (October 10, 2003) available at 
http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/docs/egf-background.doc (last visited January 2006); J.V. McHale, 
Regulating Genetic Databases: Some Legal and Ethical Issues, 12 MEDICAL LAW REVIEW 70, 78 
(Spring 2004).
221 See The U.K. Biobank website at http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk (last visited January 2006).
222 The U.K. Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework, Setting Standards, 1 (September 24, 2003) 
available at http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/docs/egf-summary.doc (last visited January 2006). 
223 Interim Advisory Group on Ethics and Governance, supra note 220, at 12-13.
224 Id., at 6-7 stating: "The EGF [Ethics and Governance Framework] construes consent as 'consent to 
participate in UK Biobank'…For contemplated uses of data or samples, or kinds of data or sample 
collection, for which existing consent does not apply, new consent must be sought."
225 Alan Doyle, Frances Rawle, & Peter Greenway, The U.K Biobank in SOCIETY AND GENETIC 
INFORMATION: CODES AND LAWS IN THE GENETIC ERA 247, 247 (Judit Sándor ed., 2003); McHale, 
supra note 220, at 73.
226 Petersen, supra note 9, at 285.
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– i.e., participants will have to be either in or not in U.K. Biobank" (emphasis in 
original).227
Notwithstanding this limitation, the participants in the project would have the 
right to withdraw from it at any time.228 The U.K. Biobank Ethics and Governance 
Framework (EGF) recognized three possible degrees of withdrawal: complete 
withdrawal that includes a request to destroy samples already collected; discontinued 
participation, meaning that no further data will be collected but continuous use of 
existing data will be permitted; and lastly, a request that no further contact and 
communication will be made with the participant, although the data already collected 
remains in the database.229  The EGF concludes that "the principle of voluntaries 
requires that participants be allowed to withdraw with little effort, at any time, and 
without having to give a reason."230
In contrast to the commercial approach taken in the Icelandic HSD Act, which 
grants a private company exclusive control over the Health Sector Database, the U.K. 
Biobank project is funded by: the Wellcome Trust, a medical research charity; two 
governmental institutions: the Medical Research Council (MRC), and the Department 
of Health; and the Scottish Executive, the devolved government of Scotland.231  The 
U.K. Biobank is publicly owned and is monitored by an independent body, the Ethics 
and Governance Council.232 This construction was designed to gain the public trust233
and it strives to promote an ongoing engagement with the public.234
227 Interim Advisory Group on Ethics and Governance, supra note 220, at 6-7.
228 Id., at 5; Doyle, Rawle, & Greenway, supra note 225, at 259-260. 
229 Interim Advisory Group on Ethics and Governance, supra note 220, at 10.
230 Id., at 10.
231 See http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/ (last visited January 2006).
232 For a chart of the UK Biobank organization, funding, and management structure see
http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about/management-structure_files/slide0004.htm (last visited January 
2006).
233 Doyle, Rawle, & Greenway, supra note 225, at 262-263.
234 Interim Advisory Group on Ethics and Governance, supra note 220, at 9.
Yael Bregman-Eschet
Genetic Databases and Biobanks: Who Controls our Genetic Privacy?
51
Another difference from the Icelandic model is that no party will be granted 
exclusive access to the U.K. database.235  Academic as well as commercial institutions 
will have access to the database based on a case-by- case evaluation of the research 
proposals and conditional upon adherence to the ethical framework of the project.236
The sample collection and the database will be legally owned by U.K. 
Biobank Limited. This means that participants in the project will not have property 
rights in the samples they provide and that U.K. Biobank retains the right to sell or 
destroy the samples and data.237 Even though the EGF states that U.K. Biobank Ltd. 
does not intend to exercise these rights, such as the right to sell the samples and data, 
designating the U.K. Biobank to be a trustee of the samples and information collected, 
rather than the owner, would have been more appropriate. In addition, the definition 
of a trustee better fits with the stated intention to serve as a "steward of the resource, 
maintaining and building it for the public good" as emphasized in the Ethics and 
Governance Framework.238
One of the main questions that the U.K. Biobank still faces is who should be 
granted access to the information collected via this project. Commercial companies, 
employers, and the insurance industry are all examples of problematic recipients of 
the data. The U.K. Human Genetics Commission supports the view that employers 
and insurers should not have access to individual genetic information in order to 
prevent the misuse of the data collected and the privacy interests of the participants.239
Similarly, the police or other law enforcement agencies will have access to the 
database only under a court order so as to not deter public participation.240 However, 
235 Interim Advisory Group on Ethics and Governance, id., at 12.
236 Id., at 12.
237 The U.K. Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework, supra note 222, at 3.
238 Id., at 3.
239 U.K. Human Genetics Commission, supra note 28.  
240 The U.K. Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework, supra note 222, at 3.
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commercial companies could gain access to the data if the ethical framework set by 
the EGF is followed. 
All identifying information, such as name and address, will be removed and 
kept separately from the information and samples, which will be coded.241 Research 
users will only have access to anonymized data and samples and only a minimal 
number of people will have access to the key and will be able to re-identify the 
information.242
This model, which rejects the public-private, commercial collaboration seen in 
Iceland and promotes a public-charitable approach, bestows data-subjects greater 
control over their personal information and its uses. Moreover, while the Icelandic 
model followed a top-down approach in order to address public concerns, the United 
Kingdom has followed a "partnership approach" aiming to work with the public.243
Nevertheless, the U.K. model is not free of criticism.244 Concerns include the 
potential ability to link the genetic and health information stored in the database with 
other data such as police or employment records; the possibility that the project would 
undermine the public trust in medical research; and the worry that the project is 
politically conceived, and hence has questionable scientific efficiency.245 The project 
has also been criticized for permitting the disclosure of future medical records, which 
may be yet unknown to the research subject, under its informed consent policy.246
Despite these concerns, this charitable model, compared to the Icelandic commercial 
model, seems to better protect the privacy and autonomy interests of the data subjects 
while nonetheless striving to enhance scientific knowledge. 
241 Id.,at 3.
242 The U.K. Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework, id., at 3.
243 See Beatrice Godard et al., Strategies for Consulting with the Community: The Cases of Four Large-
Scale Genetic Databases, 10(3) SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS, 1 (2004).
244 See Petersen, supra note 9, at 278.
245 Id.
246 Rothstein, supra note 87, at 93- 94.
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The U.K. model is preferable to the Icelandic one in several aspects. First, it 
rejected a market-type model. While the Icelandic database is ran by a private 
company that has exclusive control over it, the U.K. biobank is owned by U.K. 
Biobank Limited, a company established by governmental and charitable bodies for 
this purpose alone. This type of governance is better suited to the task, as it is less 
subject to conflicting forces and has the public's best interest at heart, rather than the 
promotion of shareholder profits. Second, the U.K. model better reflects the will and 
autonomy of the population as it chose an opt-in framework, rather than the opt-out 
model available under the Icelandic HSD Act. In addition, the U.K. model promises 
an explicit consent format, which better reflects the autonomy of the participants 
compared to the "blanket consent" granted to deCode in Iceland, although still raises 
concerns as to the ability to truly consent to the disclosure of unknown future medical 
conditions.
The fact that U.K. Biobank Limited retains ownership rights over the 
information and samples stored in the database, including the right to sell or destroy 
them, is also problematic. A preferable approach would be to treat U.K. Biobank Ltd. 
as a trustee of the information, rather than the owner, with clear limitations including 
restrictions on the right to sell, transfer, reveal, and destroy the information to third 
parties other than for the research purposes agreed to by the participants and 
authorized by an independent review board. 247  These limitations are essential if 
adequate degree of control and protection is to be given to genetic privacy and to the
autonomy of the participants of the project. 
247 See also supra note 144 and the accompanying text. 
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D. Inductions for the U.S.
The Icelandic as well as the British experiences should serve as a compass for 
the United States in its future treatment of personal genetic information. The Icelandic 
model demonstrates some of the potential dangers and the privacy breaches resulting 
from granting private commercial companies extensive control over medical and 
genetic information, including information initially collected by public authorities 
before the creation of the database.248 The British model, on the other hand, raises 
concerns as to the need to limit the power and control held by the government and 
public institutions that are collecting and handling medical and genetic information 
and material.249 Absent formal limitations and constraints, these institutions are not 
restrained from destroying data collected or transferring their medical and genetic 
collections to third parties even without the consent of the individuals to whom the 
information pertains.250 These concerns should be addressed in future treatment of 
genetic information and genetic privacy, particularly as science advances and more 
personal information could be gained from our genes.
At this point in time, it is unlikely that the private sector in the United States 
will cease to collect and store genetic information. For this reason, greater supervision 
of the conduct of the private sector must take place, limiting the control private 
companies have over personal genetic information and material and empowering the 
individuals to proactively control this information. Placing constraints on the private 
sector may be done in two different ways. The first is by introducing formal, top-
down regulations enforced by the government. The second requires the industry to 
place limitations on itself in the form of specifically designed fair information 
248 See section III.A.
249 See section III.C.
250 See supra note 237 and the accompanying text.
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practices that will deal with the various privacy and autonomy concerns that 
accompany genetic databases as raised throughout this article. 
Self-regulation in the form of fair information practices has many advantages 
over government regulation, including speed and simplicity.251 Moreover, a regime of 
fair information practices has in past experiences been successful in protecting 
information privacy.252 Hence, at this point, fair information practices that encompass 
the uniqueness of genetic information and appropriately address issues of anonymity, 
usage, and security may be well suited to the task.253 It is recommended that all 
institutions that collect, store, or manage genetic or medical information, either in the 
form of databases or biobanks, adopt the following principles as a basis for their 
privacy policies:
Opt-in Regime: The most basic way to insure that data subjects know and 
agree to be part of a genetic database or a biobank is to have them actively consent to 
it. This is especially important since genetic databases and biobanks may contain most 
private and sensitive information and it is necessary that each individual participating
in such projects be aware of her participation and consent to it. The best way to 
achieve this is by adopting an opt-in framework, which requires active consent of 
individuals prior to adding them into the database/bank. In contrast, an opt-out regime 
does not insure these important goals, but rather perpetuates an existing situation.
Informed Consent: Data subjects should be asked to give explicit informed 
consent to the uses of the data collected. The British model and the Icelandic model, 
as previously explained, serve as prototypes for different degrees of informed consent. 
251 See also section II.C.
252 See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry 
Doesn't Get), 2001 STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW 1, 44-46 (2001). For a different view see
Campbell, supra note 91, concluding that self-regulation did not live up to its expectations when 
applied to digital television public interest responsibilities and to privacy  protection on the internet.
253 See also Samuelson, supra note 117, at 1169.
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Analysis of these two models favors the explicit informed consent framework adopted 
in the British model compared to the weaker alternative adopted by the HSD Act.
Withdrawal:  Each participant in genetic databases or biobanks should be 
given the opportunity to withdraw its participation in the database at any given time.
Withdrawal should be accompanied with the possibility to request the deletion or 
destruction of information and material already existing in the database/biobank. 
Once again, the British biobank, which better serves this goal compared to the 
Icelandic database, could serve as an appropriate model.
Security: Strict and coherent means of security should be implemented to 
safeguard the information collected, including its encryption. Only coded information 
should be transferred from public to private entities and the decoding key and 
identifiable information must remain with the original holder, unless the individual 
consented otherwise. 
Confidentiality: Researchers should take strict measures to insure that the 
privacy and confidentiality of data subjects are kept. Identifiable information should 
be coded and kept separate from the samples collected. Only a limited number of 
people should have access to the identifiable information or to the decoding key. 
Privacy policies should be adopted and followed by each institution. 
Ownership: Each privacy policy should be clear as to whether the holders of 
the information view themselves as owners, holding property rights over it, or simply 
as trustees of the information. The latter is viewed as more fit to this domain, and is 
hence preferable. If, however, a property rights regime is maintained, it is crucial to 
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place clear restrictions on the use of the data collected in addition to limiting 
transferability.254
Information Transfer: Each privacy policy should be explicit as to its stance 
towards information transfer to third parties. It is recommended that clear limitations 
be placed in this regard. Specific guidelines should be construed to provide answers to 
situations that include transfer of information outside the national borders and that 
level of privacy protection that must be maintained by the new holder. In any event, 
transfer of identifiable information should not take place absent the explicit consent of 
the data subjects.
Information Sharing: It is further advised that institutions that hold genetic 
information or material follow an explicit policy that refrains from transferring or 
revealing sensitive information to entities such as insurance companies or employers 
that may make use of such information for discrimination purposes. Similarly, it is 
recommended not to mix military or criminal databases with research ones absent the 
explicit consent of the research subjects so as to maintain the public trust.
Accountability: Lastly, it is crucial that institutions or personnel that breach 
these principles be held accountable for their actions. In order to ensure this it may be 
useful to have some type of government supervision on the conduct of entities holding 
such sensitive information in addition to industry compliance mechanisms.255
In addition to this set of principles and notwithstanding the importance of self-
regulation, government involvement is not to be dismissed. The fact that several 
private companies chose to adhere with the HIPPA regulations even when claiming 
254 The latter is an application of the "Hybrid inalienability" model proposed by Paul Schwartz. See
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 2090-2094. 
255 Schwartz identifies three purposes for which supervising institutions are needed: 1) to provide 
trading mechanisms; 2) to verify claims to propertized personal data; and 3) to police compliance 
with the agreed-upon terms. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 2110.
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they were not obliged to do so,256 illustrates the power of government participation
and its significance in the works of the private sector. The government can and should 
encourage the private sector to adopt these principles and practices by providing 
economic incentives to those who comply and by policing the conduct of the 
institutions. 
One issue discussed above specifically calls for government regulation and 
should not be left to self-regulation alone. That is the mandate granted to the private 
sector over medical and genetic information and material and the freedom granted by 
it to transfer the information to third parties without any limitations. The private 
industry cannot be viewed as the owner of the medical and genetic information and 
material it collects for transferring purposes;257 but rather, it should be legally defined 
as a trustee of the information and samples collected.258  Under this mechanism, 
private companies as well as public institutions will not be banned from transferring 
their medical and genetic collections to a third party, but rather would be required to 
receive explicit consent from each individual whose information is included in the 
database prior to taking such meaningful steps. This will restore the control of the 
individuals over their personal genetic information and will ensure individual 
knowledge and agreement to the whereabouts of their personal genetic information 
and its uses. 
256 See supra note 133 and the accompanying text.
257 The discussion above does not refer to the issue of ownership for intellectual property purposes. 
Ownership by physicians, researchers, and companies for intellectual property purposes over genetic 
discoveries derived from genetic material collected from volunteers, calls for a different analysis 
that is out of the scope of this article. 
258 See also supra note 144 and the accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION
This article examines the emergence of public and private genetic databases 
and bio-repositories as well as the newly formed partnerships between the public and 
private sectors in the genetic realm. It calls for a prompt establishment of industry-
wide fair information practices for assembly, storage, use, and safeguarding of genetic 
data, in order to adequately protect personal genetic privacy and autonomy. 
Lack of adequate limitations enable the private sector to gain growing, almost 
unlimited, control over personal genetic information and material, while ignoring the 
privacy and autonomy rights and needs of data subjects. Taking privacy and 
autonomy of the research subjects seriously is not meant to undermine research but 
rather safeguard research subjects from possible misuses and establish public trust 
that is crucial for future scientific endeavors. The best and quickest way to insure the 
credibility of genetic databases and biobanks, and to protect the privacy and 
autonomy of data subjects, is by adopting and implementing fair information practices 
as suggested.  
